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This	  paper	  presents	  a	  new	  conception	  of	  “Arab	  nationalism,”	  which	  conventionally	  means	  
pan-­Arab	  nationalism	  and	  defines	  an	  Arab	  as	  an	  Arabic	  speaker.	  	  Yet	  the	  term	  “Arabic”	  is	  
elusive,	  as	  is	  the	  generic	  “Arabic	  speaker.”	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic	  (MSA),	  derived	  from	  the	  
Koran,	  is	  the	  official	  language	  of	  Arab	  League	  states,	  but	  is	  nobody’s	  mother	  tongue,	  or	  spoken	  
language	  for	  that	  matter.	  Arabic	  vernaculars	  are	  deemed	  low	  status	  and	  are	  distinct	  from	  
MSA.	  The	  division	  of	  “High”	  and	  “Low”	  languages	  between	  formal	  and	  informal	  spheres	  is	  
called	  diglossia	  (“divided	  tongues”).	  This	  renders	  an	  ethnolinguistic	  situation	  in	  Arab	  states	  
with	  unique	  social	  and	  political	  consequences.	  	  Arab-­defined	  citizens	  are	  born	  into	  unique	  
ethnolinguistic	  communities	  that	  are	  not	  state-­supported,	  and	  are	  indoctrinated	  instead	  with	  




Without	  school	  or	  book,	  the	  making	  of	  a	  nation	  is	  in	  modern	  times	  inconceivable.	  
George	  Antonius,	  The	  Arab	  Awakening,	  1938	  
	  
The	  literature	  on	  Arab	  nationalism,	  however	  defined,	  is	  very	  broad,	  very	  deep,	  and	  very	  
muddy.	  	  Much	  of	  it	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  singular	  problem	  of	  defining	  “Arab”	  and	  
consequently	  “Arab	  nationalism.”	  Some	  of	  this	  work	  developed	  from	  the	  study	  of	  
nationalism	  and	  some	  of	  this	  work	  developed	  from	  the	  study	  of	  Arabs,	  yet	  the	  two	  tracks	  
do	  not	  frequently	  converge.	  Terminology	  is	  a	  principal	  reason	  why	  much	  of	  the	  research	  on	  
Arab	  nationalism	  is	  muddled.	  What	  are	  the	  precise	  distinctions	  separating	  Arab	  
nationalism,	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism	  (qawmiyya),	  and	  Arab	  patriotism	  (wataniyya)?	  In	  the	  
context	  of	  specific	  countries,	  what	  is	  the	  difference,	  for	  example,	  between	  Egyptian	  
nationalism	  and	  Egyptian	  patriotism?	  Or	  Egyptian	  nationalism	  and	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism?	  	  	  
	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  nations	  and	  nationalism	  scholarship,	  Ernest	  Gellner	  offers	  the	  
most	  influential	  answer	  to	  this	  set	  of	  questions.	  His	  general	  model	  of	  nationalism	  argues	  
the	  structural	  effects	  of	  modernization	  (urbanization,	  industrialization,	  communication,	  
education)	  compel	  states	  to	  create	  nations	  even	  where	  none	  existed	  previously.1	  This	  
                                                
1	  Ernest	  Gellner,	  Nations	  and	  Nationalism	  	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1983).	  	  
Mabry	  /	  The	  Levantine	  Review	  Volume	  2	  Number	  1	  (Spring	  2013)	  





process	  homogenizes	  a	  population	  by	  assimilating	  separate	  Low	  cultures	  into	  a	  single	  
shared	  High	  culture	  with	  a	  standardized	  High	  (formal	  and	  standardized)	  language	  that	  is	  
maintained	  by	  the	  state,	  or	  in	  this	  case	  a	  nation-­‐state.	  An	  alternate	  model	  is	  the	  civic	  nation,	  
typically	  a	  settler	  state	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  or	  Australia,	  which	  unites	  many	  ethnicities	  
with	  a	  shared	  ideology	  and	  patriotic	  sentiment,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  agreement	  to	  share	  the	  same	  
language	  (e.g.	  English,	  French,	  Spanish).	  However,	  imagined	  civic	  nations	  frequently	  betray	  
ethnic	  affinities	  when	  challenged	  by	  internal	  rivals,	  leading	  to	  such	  phenomena	  as	  the	  
“English	  only”	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (spawned	  by	  anti-­‐immigration	  activists)	  or	  a	  
new	  requirement	  for	  civil	  servants	  in	  Bolivia	  to	  speak	  Quecha	  or	  Aymara	  following	  the	  
election	  of	  that	  country’s	  first	  indigenous	  president,	  Evo	  Morales,	  in	  2005.	  
	  
Civic	  nations	  are	  distinct	  from	  ethnic	  nations	  in	  their	  origins	  and	  composition,	  but	  their	  
states	  follow	  the	  same	  logic	  of	  cultural	  unity,	  i.e.	  a	  fusion	  of	  Low	  and	  High	  into	  a	  ubiquitous	  
national	  culture	  that	  enjoys	  official	  status.	  Low	  cultures	  inexorably	  disappear	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  modernity;	  disparate	  vernaculars	  are	  supplanted	  by	  a	  shared	  mother	  
tongue,	  i.e.	  the	  national	  language.	  The	  exception	  to	  this	  modernist	  paradigm	  of	  nation	  
formation	  is	  found	  in	  the	  Islamic	  faith,	  which	  is	  not	  only	  a	  religion,	  but	  is	  in	  itself	  also	  a	  
High	  culture	  with	  a	  High	  language	  all	  its	  own:	  Arabic.	  Thus,	  for	  Muslims,	  Islam	  is	  arguably	  a	  
societal	  blueprint	  that	  precludes	  the	  evolution	  and	  assimilation	  of	  disparate	  Low	  cultures	  
into	  a	  national	  High	  culture.2	  Low	  cultures	  and	  their	  languages	  remain	  low	  status	  and	  
distinct,	  but	  are	  not	  absorbed.	  Thus,	  Muslim	  societies	  are	  exceptionally	  resistant	  to	  
ethnolinguistic	  nationalism.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  there	  could	  not	  be	  some	  identification	  with	  a	  
state,	  e.g.	  Algerian	  patriotism,	  but	  for	  Gellner	  a	  term	  like	  “Algerian	  nation”	  is	  a	  misnomer.	  
	  
For	  somewhat	  different	  reasons	  that	  hinge	  on	  Islamic	  political	  thought,	  some	  historians	  
have	  also	  come	  to	  this	  conclusion,	  including	  Bernard	  Lewis	  and	  Adrian	  Hastings.3	  Other	  
important	  contributions	  on	  Arabs	  from	  scholars	  of	  nationalism	  include	  those	  by	  Elie	  and	  
Sylvia	  Kedourie,	  as	  well	  as	  John	  Breuilly,	  who	  argues	  Arab	  nationalism	  emerged	  first	  as	  a	  	  
“sort	  of	  modern	  anti-­‐colonial	  nationalism”	  against	  the	  Ottomans,	  catalyzed	  when	  imperial	  
administrators	  in	  Arab	  lands	  started	  acting	  less	  like	  Ottomans	  and	  more	  like	  Turks.4	  
                                                
2	  Muslim	  Society	  	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1981).	  	  See	  also	  Islamic	  
Dilemmas:	  Reformers,	  Nationalists,	  Industrialization	  (Berlin	  ;	  New	  York:	  Mouton	  Publishers,	  
1985);	  Postmodernism,	  Reason	  and	  Religion	  	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1992);	  Conditions	  of	  
Liberty:	  Civil	  Society	  and	  Its	  Rivals	  	  (London:	  Hamish	  Hamilton,	  1994).	  
3	  Bernard	  Lewis,	  “The	  Roots	  of	  Muslim	  Rage,”	  The	  Atlantic	  Monthly,	  September	  1990;	  The	  
Multiple	  Identities	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  &	  Nicolson,	  1998);	  Adrian	  
Hastings,	  The	  Construction	  of	  Nationhood:	  Ethnicity,	  Religion	  and	  Nationalism,	  Wiles	  
lectures;	  1996	  ed.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  
4	  Elie	  Kedourie,	  Democracy	  and	  Arab	  Political	  Culture	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Washington	  
Institute	  for	  Near	  East	  Policy,	  1992),	  Sylvia	  Kedourie,	  Arab	  Nationalism	  and	  a	  Wider	  World	  
(New	  York:	  American	  Academic	  Association	  for	  Peace	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  1971),	  John	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There	  is	  much	  more,	  however,	  written	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Arab	  and/or	  Middle	  East	  
studies.	  	  Because	  the	  story	  is	  so	  complex,	  and	  because	  there	  are	  many	  competing	  
interpretations	  of	  key	  events,	  most	  monographs	  are	  histories	  that	  trace	  a	  narrative	  lasting	  
at	  least	  a	  century.5	  More	  focused	  work	  tends	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  nationalism	  in	  a	  specific	  
territory	  over	  time,	  particularly	  Lebanon,	  Palestine,	  and	  especially	  Syria,	  the	  site	  of	  the	  
Great	  Revolt	  that	  erupted	  between	  the	  end	  of	  rule	  by	  the	  Ottomans	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  
French	  rule.6	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  violent	  event	  is	  not	  in	  doubt,	  as	  “there	  is	  common	  
agreement	  among	  scholars	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  that	  Greater	  Syria	  was	  the	  main	  arena	  in	  
the	  development	  and	  promotion	  of	  this	  Arab	  nationalist	  ideology	  and	  movement.”7	  
Nonetheless,	  most	  of	  this	  work	  accepts	  the	  existence	  of	  “the	  Arabs”	  as	  prima	  facie,	  
holistically	  a	  collective	  that	  is	  somehow	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  heterogeneous	  parts.8	  
                                                                                                                                                       
Breuilly,	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  State,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  
1993	  [1982]),	  p.	  149-­‐51.	  
5	  Fouad	  Ajami,	  The	  Dream	  Palace	  of	  the	  Arabs:	  A	  Generation’s	  Odyssey,	  1st	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  
Pantheon	  Books,	  1998),	  Youssef	  M.	  Choueiri,	  Arab	  Nationalism	  -­	  a	  History:	  Nation	  and	  State	  
in	  the	  Arab	  World	  (Oxford;	  Malden,	  Mass.:	  Blackwell	  Pub.,	  2000),	  A.	  I.	  Dawisha,	  Arab	  
Nationalism	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century:	  From	  Triumph	  to	  Despair	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2003),	  Keith	  David	  Watenpaugh,	  Being	  Modern	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  
Revolution,	  Nationalism,	  Colonialism,	  and	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  Class	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2006).	  
6	  K.	  M.	  Firro,	  “Lebanese	  Nationalism	  Versus	  Arabism:	  From	  Bulus	  Nujaym	  to	  Michel	  Chiha,”	  
Middle	  Eastern	  Studies	  40,	  no.	  5	  (2004),	  James	  L.	  Gelvin,	  Divided	  Loyalties:	  Nationalism	  and	  
Mass	  Politics	  in	  Syria	  at	  the	  Close	  of	  Empire	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1998),	  
Basheer	  M.	  Nafi,	  Arabism,	  Islamism	  and	  the	  Palestine	  Question,	  1908-­1941:	  A	  Political	  History	  
(London:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  1998),	  Michael	  Provence,	  The	  Great	  Syrian	  Revolt	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  
Arab	  Nationalism	  (Austin:	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press,	  2005).	  	  Important	  and	  influential	  
collections	  addressing	  a	  range	  of	  cases	  include:	  Derek	  Hopwood,	  ed.,	  Arab	  Nation,	  Arab	  
Nationalism	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  2000),	  James	  P.	  Jankowski	  and	  I.	  Gershoni,	  
Rethinking	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  East	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  
1997),	  Elizabeth	  Thompson,	  Colonial	  Citizens:	  Republican	  Rights,	  Paternal	  Privilege,	  and	  
Gender	  in	  French	  Syria	  and	  Lebanon	  	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  Philip	  S.	  
Khoury,	  Urban	  Notables	  and	  Arab	  Nationalism:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Damascus,	  1860-­1920,	  
Cambridge	  Middle	  East	  Library	  (Cambridge	  [Cambridgeshire]	  ;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1983);	  Syria	  and	  the	  French	  Mandate:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism,	  
1920-­1945,	  Princeton	  Studies	  on	  the	  near	  East	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  
1987).	  
7	  Yasir	  Suleiman,	  The	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Study	  in	  Ideology	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  p.	  70.	  
8	  On	  this	  point,	  Gelvin	  is	  an	  important	  exception.	  Recounting	  events	  in	  post-­‐Ottoman	  Syria,	  
the	  historian	  showed	  “the	  presumption	  that	  there	  existed	  a	  singular	  and	  undifferentiated	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Central	  players	  in	  the	  formative	  years	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  debated	  questions	  about	  who	  is	  
an	  Arab	  and	  what	  is	  the	  Arab	  nation.	  Considering	  the	  symbiosis	  of	  Islam	  and	  Arab	  culture	  
(the	  faith	  springs	  from	  Arabia,	  the	  language	  of	  the	  faith	  is	  Arabic,	  and	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  
Arabs	  are	  Muslim,)	  it	  seems	  paradoxical	  that	  many	  pioneering	  theorists	  of	  Arab	  
nationalism	  were	  not	  Muslim.	  Instead,	  those	  who	  had	  the	  most	  to	  lose	  under	  a	  faith-­‐based	  
definition	  of	  Arab	  identity,	  i.e.	  the	  minority	  of	  “ethnic	  Arabs”	  who	  were	  non-­‐Muslims,	  
advanced	  a	  secular	  and	  ethnic	  interpretation	  of	  Arab	  identity	  that	  eschewed	  Islam	  as	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  of	  being	  Arab.	  
	  
George	  Antonius	  (1891-­‐1941,)	  the	  author	  of	  The	  Arab	  Awakening	  (1938,)	  was	  a	  Christian	  of	  
Lebanese	  and	  Egyptian	  heritage	  born	  in	  what	  was	  then	  the	  British	  Mandate	  of	  Palestine.9	  
Michel	  Aflaq	  (1910-­‐1989,)	  the	  ideological	  founder	  of	  the	  Baath	  (“revival”)	  Party,	  was	  a	  
Greek	  Orthodox	  Christian	  from	  Damascus.	  This	  is	  explicable,	  however,	  because	  pan-­‐Arab	  
nationalism	  was	  crafted	  to	  unite	  a	  region	  of	  disparate	  peoples	  adhering	  to	  multiple	  beliefs,	  
so	  the	  doctrine	  was	  pragmatically	  secular,	  and	  accentuated	  “Arabness”	  (uruba)	  rather	  than	  
Islam.	  Aflaq’s	  “spiritual	  guide”	  was	  the	  “prophet	  of	  Arab	  nationalism,”	  Sati	  al-­‐Husri,	  a	  
former	  schoolteacher	  educated	  in	  Istanbul	  who	  later	  infused	  the	  educational	  systems	  of	  
Syria,	  Iraq	  and	  Egypt	  with	  his	  ideas	  about	  the	  Arab	  people.10	  Chief	  among	  these	  ideas	  was	  
who	  qualified	  as	  an	  Arab:	  “Every	  Arab-­‐speaking	  people	  is	  an	  Arab	  people.	  	  Every	  individual	  
belonging	  to	  one	  of	  these	  Arabic-­‐speaking	  peoples	  is	  an	  Arab.”11	  Ay,	  there’s	  the	  rub:	  what	  
precisely	  is	  spoken	  Arabic?	  Remarkably,	  this	  simple	  question	  belies	  an	  impassioned	  debate.	  
	  
In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow,	  this	  paper	  addresses	  the	  methods	  and	  meanings	  of	  determining	  
the	  demographics	  of	  the	  Arab	  world,	  the	  sociolinguistics	  of	  Arabic,	  the	  remarkably	  thorny	  
relationship	  of	  language	  and	  nationalism	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  and	  finally	  the	  direction	  of	  
Arabic	  language	  policies	  and	  politics	  as	  evidenced	  in	  recent	  literature	  on	  education	  in	  Arab	  
states.	  	  As	  to	  whether	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  nationalism	  in	  the	  Arab	  world,	  I	  
argue	  that	  there	  is	  not	  one,	  but	  two	  varieties	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  identification.	  	  They	  are	  
separated	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  sociolinguistic	  phenomenon	  called	  diglossia,	  a	  term	  
that	  literally	  means	  two	  tongues.	  The	  parallel	  languages	  are	  variously	  positioned	  as	  High	  
                                                                                                                                                       
“Arab	  nationalism”	  and	  “Arab	  nationalist	  movement”	  is	  not	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  evidence.”	  	  
Gelvin,	  Divided	  Loyalties:	  Nationalism	  and	  Mass	  Politics	  in	  Syria	  at	  the	  Close	  of	  Empire,	  p.	  
287.	  
9	  George	  Antonius,	  The	  Arab	  Awakening	  (London:	  Hamish	  Hamilton,	  1938).	  
10	  The	  original	  is	  “prophète	  du	  nationalisme	  intégral	  arabe	  des	  années	  1930	  et	  guide	  
spirituel	  de	  Michel	  Aflak,	  ideologue-­‐en-­‐chef	  et	  fondateur	  du	  fameux	  parti	  Baas.”	  	  Franck	  
Salameh,	  “Vous	  Êtes	  Arabes	  Puisque	  Je	  Vous	  Le	  Dis!,”	  Journal	  d’étude	  des	  relations	  
internationales	  au	  Moyen-­Orient	  1,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  p.	  52.	  
11	  Citation	  and	  translation	  from	  Dawisha,	  Arab	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century:	  From	  
Triumph	  to	  Despair,	  p.	  72.	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versus	  Low,	  pure	  versus	  impure,	  cultured	  versus	  common.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Arabic,	  I	  argue	  
that	  the	  High	  language,	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic,	  is	  positioned	  above	  dozens	  of	  common	  
Low	  varieties	  often	  called	  dialects	  but	  which	  are	  defined	  here	  by	  what	  I	  call	  demotic	  Arabic.	  
Correspondingly,	  citizens	  of	  Arab	  states	  incorporate	  parallel	  but	  politically	  incompatible	  
varieties	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  identification,	  a	  condition	  that	  I	  call	  Arab	  dinationalism.	  
	  
ARABS	  AND	  MUSLIMS,	  RULES	  AND	  EXCEPTIONS	  
If	  Arab	  societies	  are	  exceptionally	  resistant	  to	  ethnolinguistic	  nationalism,	  then	  there	  
should	  be	  scant	  evidence	  of	  Arab-­‐defined	  minorities	  agitating	  for	  autonomy	  or	  
independence	  from	  other	  Arabs.	  Yes,	  there	  are	  Muslim	  minorities	  politically	  mobilized	  
within	  Arab	  states—Berbers	  in	  Morocco,	  Kurds	  in	  Iraq—but	  an	  “Arab	  ethnic”	  minority	  in	  a	  
state	  with	  an	  “ethnic	  Arab”	  majority	  is	  a	  logical	  impossibility,	  a	  paradox,	  if	  they	  belong	  to	  
the	  same	  ethnic	  group.12	  Certainly	  within	  any	  Arab	  population	  there	  will	  be	  subcultures	  
and	  socioeconomic	  divides	  just	  as	  there	  are	  in	  any	  non-­‐Arab	  society,	  but	  if	  there	  is	  but	  one	  
Arab	  people	  united	  by	  an	  ethnonational	  bond,	  then	  an	  ethnic	  minority	  in	  an	  Arab	  
population	  is	  possible	  only	  if	  they	  are	  not	  Arab.	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  an	  ethnic	  Russian	  in	  
Russia	  cannot	  be	  an	  ethnic	  minority	  in	  Russia.	  
	  
It	  is	  this	  paradox	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter	  of	  Arab	  nationalism	  and	  therefore	  the	  
focus	  of	  this	  paper.	  
	  
If	  the	  argument	  that	  Muslims,	  including	  Arabs,	  are	  exceptionally	  resistant	  to	  ethnic	  
mobilization	  in	  pursuit	  of	  national	  self-­‐determination,	  which	  in	  turn	  means	  a	  state	  with	  
borders	  that	  are	  contiguous	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  unique	  people,	  what	  are	  we	  to	  make	  
of	  twenty-­‐one	  Arab	  states?	  Muslim	  exceptionalism	  anticipates	  such	  a	  fractionalized	  
collection	  because	  a	  nation-­‐state	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  Islamic	  conception	  of	  ummah,	  i.e.	  a	  
united	  community	  of	  believers	  who	  declare	  there	  is	  no	  God	  but	  Allah	  and	  that	  Muhammad	  
is	  the	  messenger	  of	  God.	  Though	  the	  concept	  is	  by	  no	  means	  fixed,	  the	  ummah	  
conventionally	  represents	  “the	  essential	  unity	  and	  theoretical	  equality	  of	  Muslims	  from	  
diverse	  cultural	  and	  geographical	  settings.”13	  As	  a	  principle	  of	  regime	  legitimacy,	  a	  state	  
should	  therefore	  be	  united	  as	  a	  community	  of	  co-­‐believers	  rather	  than	  a	  community	  of	  co-­‐
nationals.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Islamist	  organizer	  Kalim	  Saddiqui,	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  
                                                
12	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  most	  famous	  example	  of	  an	  Arab	  population	  fighting	  for	  self-­‐rule:	  
Palestinians.	  	  Yet	  this	  case	  is	  nothing	  if	  not	  problematic.	  	  If	  adhering	  strictly	  to	  international	  
law,	  the	  population	  of	  Palestine	  is	  stateless.	  	  Therefore,	  they	  are	  not	  a	  minority	  of	  any	  state.	  	  
They	  are	  also	  distinct	  from	  the	  Arab	  minority	  within	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  	  There	  are	  also	  
Palestinians	  in	  Jordan,	  who	  are	  a	  minority	  in	  that	  state,	  but	  this	  again	  raises	  the	  paradox	  of	  
an	  ethnic	  Arab	  minority	  in	  an	  ethnic	  Arab	  state.	  
13	  John	  L.	  Esposito,	  The	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  Islam	  	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2003),	  327.	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Muslim	  Parliament	  in	  Britain,	  “the	  path	  of	  the	  Ummah	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Islamic	  movement	  
within	  the	  Ummah	  is	  blocked	  by	  the	  nation-­‐states.”14	  
	  
A	  common	  explanation	  for	  the	  relative	  abundance	  of	  Arab	  states	  is	  the	  shared	  legacy	  of	  
Ottoman,	  French	  and	  British	  imperialism:	  borders	  were	  approved	  in	  Istanbul,	  Paris	  and	  
London	  irrespective	  of	  demographic	  facts	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  the	  Sahara	  or	  Sahel,	  Maghreb	  or	  
Hejaz.	  Exogenous	  forces	  forged	  new	  states,	  and	  the	  so-­‐called	  international	  (more	  properly	  
inter-­‐state)	  system	  sustained	  these	  entities	  by	  recognizing	  their	  sovereignty,	  entering	  into	  
treaties,	  forging	  military	  alliances,	  and	  establishing	  economic	  ties.	  Yet	  the	  modernist	  
paradigm	  of	  ethnonational	  mobilization	  and	  modularity	  expects	  states	  to	  create	  nations	  
even	  where	  none	  existed.	  In	  one	  formulation,	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  single	  
Arab	  state,	  extending	  famously	  “from	  the	  Gulf	  to	  the	  Ocean,”	  that	  is	  home	  to	  a	  single	  Arab	  
nation.	  In	  another	  formulation	  (for	  the	  time	  being	  consider	  it	  mono-­‐Arab	  nationalism),	  
separate	  post-­‐colonial	  Arab	  states	  would	  engender	  the	  growth	  of	  ethnonational	  identities	  
loyal	  to	  their	  own	  flag,	  their	  own	  nation-­‐state.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  unique	  national	  languages	  
and	  cultures	  of	  distinct	  peoples	  (Lebanese,	  Egyptian,	  etc.)	  would	  be	  promoted,	  protected,	  
and	  recreated	  by	  the	  institutions	  of	  separate	  states.15	  This	  disconnect	  begs	  the	  question	  
“who	  is	  an	  Arab?”	  
	  
ARAB	  DEMOGRAPHICS	  
For	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  defining	  nation	  is	  a	  thankless	  task,	  defining	  Arab	  is	  a	  job	  for	  
Sisyphus.	  Who	  is	  or	  is	  not	  an	  Arab?	  Does	  Arab	  define	  a	  culture,	  an	  ethnicity,	  a	  nation,	  or	  a	  
civilization?	  	  Does	  the	  term	  Arab	  qualify	  for	  all,	  some	  or	  none	  of	  these	  categories?	  
Identifying	  an	  Arab	  state,	  at	  least,	  is	  a	  simpler	  affair,	  since	  there	  is	  a	  precise	  count	  of	  21	  
voluntary	  states	  (and	  the	  Palestinian	  Territories)	  that	  are	  members	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Arab	  
States	  (hereafter	  shortened	  to	  the	  conventional	  Arab	  League).	  Each	  member	  of	  the	  League	  
shares	  two	  things	  in	  common:	  1)	  Islam	  is	  the	  faith	  of	  the	  majority;	  2)	  Arabic	  is	  (one	  of)	  the	  
official	  language(s)	  of	  the	  state.	  
	  
It	  may	  be	  suggested	  that	  an	  Arab	  person,	  therefore,	  is	  an	  Arabic-­‐speaking	  Muslim,	  yet	  this	  
is	  problematic.	  If	  a	  Palestinian	  Christian	  speaks	  Arabic	  but	  is	  not	  a	  Muslim,	  is	  he	  then	  not	  an	  
Arab?	  	  If	  a	  Berber	  Muslim	  in	  Algeria	  cannot	  speak	  Arabic,	  is	  he	  not	  an	  Arab?	  What	  exactly	  is	  
meant	  by	  the	  term	  Arabic,	  whether	  ancient	  or	  modern,	  written	  or	  spoken?	  These	  issues	  
surface	  time	  and	  again	  (and	  again	  and	  again)	  in	  statistics	  attempting	  to	  measure	  Arab	  
populations.	  The	  CIA	  World	  Factbook,	  for	  example,	  often	  attaches	  tortured	  qualifications	  to	  
the	  term	  “Arab.”	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Algeria,	  for	  example,	  it	  records	  that	  ninety-­‐nine	  percent	  of	  
                                                
14	  Kalim	  Siddiqui,	  “Nation-­‐States	  as	  Obstacles	  to	  the	  Total	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Ummah,”	  
in	  The	  Impact	  of	  Nationalism	  on	  the	  Muslim	  World,	  ed.	  M.	  Ghayasuddin	  (London:	  The	  Open	  
Press	  and	  Al-­‐Hoda	  Publishers,	  1986),	  4.	  
15	  A	  Moroccan,	  for	  example,	  would	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Moroccan	  nation,	  while	  his	  Arab	  
heritage	  would	  be	  much	  removed	  and	  studied	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  history,	  not	  politics.	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the	  population	  are	  hybridized	  “Arab-­‐Berber,”	  but	  adds	  “almost	  all	  Algerians	  are	  Berber	  in	  
origin,	  not	  Arab;	  the	  minority	  who	  identify	  themselves	  as	  Berber	  live	  mostly	  in	  the	  
mountainous	  region	  of	  Kabylie	  east	  of	  Algiers;	  the	  Berbers	  are	  also	  Muslim	  but	  identify	  
with	  their	  Berber	  rather	  than	  Arab	  cultural	  heritage.”	  
	  
This	  categorization	  would	  indicate	  “Arab”	  is	  at	  once	  an	  ethnicity,	  i.e.	  a	  unique	  people	  
distinct	  from	  another	  ethnos,	  Berber,	  and	  a	  politically	  salient	  identity,	  and	  a	  culture	  with	  a	  
distinguished	  pedigree.	  This	  is	  not	  helpful.	  An	  alternate	  source	  for	  aggregate	  ethnicity	  data	  
is	  the	  Demographic	  Yearbook	  issued	  by	  the	  UNESCO.	  The	  reference	  compiles	  census	  data	  on	  
separate	  ethnic	  populations	  that	  is	  furnished	  by	  member	  countries:	  it	  is	  very	  detailed	  but	  
entirely	  incomplete.	  Of	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Arab	  League,	  only	  Yemen	  and	  the	  Occupied	  
Palestinian	  Territories	  are	  represented.16	  A	  third	  and	  often	  overlooked	  (but	  eminently	  
useful)	  collection	  of	  state-­‐level	  statistics	  is	  available	  from	  Britannica	  World	  Data,	  a	  division	  
of	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  that	  annually	  estimates	  statistics	  based	  on	  its	  own	  collections	  
of	  government	  publications,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  and	  private	  reports	  gauging	  social	  and	  
economic	  indicators	  for	  214	  countries.17	  Estimates	  for	  ethnic	  composition—defined	  as	  the	  
“ethnic,	  racial,	  or	  linguistic	  composition”	  of	  a	  country’s	  population—are	  both	  detailed	  and	  
complete.18	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  CIA	  estimate	  for	  Algeria,	  which	  fudges	  with	  99	  per	  cent	  
“Arab-­‐Berber,”	  the	  Britannica	  statisticians	  estimate	  the	  following:	  “Algerian	  Arab	  59.1%;	  
Berber	  26.2%,	  of	  which	  Arabized	  Berber	  3.0%;	  Bedouin	  Arab	  14.5%;	  other	  0.2%.”19	  By	  
compiling	  data	  from	  both	  sources,	  including	  current	  estimates	  of	  state	  populations	  and	  
ethnic	  compositions,	  it	  appears	  that	  from	  twenty-­‐one	  states	  in	  the	  Arab	  League,	  the	  
aggregate	  population	  of	  Arabs	  is	  just	  under	  two	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  million.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  
global	  Muslim	  population	  is	  1.3	  billion,	  this	  means	  the	  “Arab	  world”	  represents	  nineteen	  
percent	  of	  the	  “Muslim	  world,”	  or	  not	  quite	  one	  in	  five.	  
	  










Egypt	   78,887,007	   91.6	   72,260,498	  
Algeria	   32,930,091	   76.6	   25,224,450	  
                                                
16	  See	  “Table	  4:	  Population	  by	  national	  and	  or	  ethnic	  group,	  sex,	  urban/rural	  residence	  and	  
percentage:	  each	  census,	  1985-­‐2002”	  (first	  release:	  1	  September	  2005,	  current	  version:	  30	  
June	  2006)	  in	  United	  Nations,	  “Demographic	  Yearbook	  Special	  Census	  Topics,”	  
unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/DYBcensus/V2_Table4.pdf.	  
17	  Encyclopaedia	  Britannica	  inc.,	  Britannica	  Book	  of	  the	  Year	  (Chicago:	  Encyclopaedia	  
Britannica,	  2006).	  
18	  Ibid.,	  p.	  503.	  
19	  “Algeria”	  in	  Ibid.	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Saudi	  Arabia	   27,019,731	   88.1	   23,804,383	  
Morocco	   33,241,259	   68.0	   22,604,056	  
Yemen	   21,456,188	   92.8	   19,911,342	  
Iraq	   26,783,383	   64.7	   17,328,849	  
Syria	   18,881,361	   86.2	   16,275,733	  
Sudan	   41,236,378	   39.0	   16,082,187	  
Tunisia	   10,175,014	   98.2	   9,991,864	  
Jordan	   5,906,760	   97.8	   5,776,811	  
Libya	   5,900,754	   87.1	   5,139,557	  
Palestine	   3,889,249	   89.0	   3,461,432	  
Lebanon	   3,874,050	   84.5	   3,273,572	  
Mauritania	   3,177,388	   70.0	   2,224,172	  
Kuwait	   2,418,393	   74.0	   1,789,611	  
Oman	   3,102,229	   55.3	   1,715,533	  
United	  Arab	  
Emirates	   2,602,713	   48.1	   1,251,905	  
Qatar	   885,359	   52.5	   464,813	  
Bahrain	   698,585	   63.9	   446,396	  
Somalia	   8,863,338	   2.2	   194,993	  
Djibouti	   486,530	   11.0	   53,518	  
Comoros	   690,948	   0.1	   691	  
TOTAL	   333,106,708	   	   249,276,367	  
Adapted	  by	  the	  author	  from	  the	  CIA	  World	  Factbook	  (2006)	  and	  
Britannica	  World	  Data	  (2006).	  
a	  Population	  estimates	  from	  CIA	  World	  Factbook	  for	  July	  2006.	  
b	  Ethnic	  composition	  estimates	  are	  from	  Britannica	  World	  Data	  
for	  the	  year	  2000.	  
c	  Ethnic	  composition	  estimate	  for	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territories	  
is	  from	  CIA	  World	  Factbook	  for	  July	  2006.	  
	  
In	  the	  example	  cited	  in	  TABLE	  I,	  the	  categorization	  “Algeria	  Arab”	  indicates	  there	  are	  
sufficiently	  delineated	  species	  of	  the	  genus	  Arab	  to	  require	  the	  qualifier	  “Algerian”	  and	  
thereby	  distinguish	  this	  population	  from	  any	  other	  Arab	  population,	  such	  as	  “Sudanese”	  or	  
“Saudi”	  Arab.	  It	  rejects	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  single	  Arab	  ethnicity	  while	  suggesting	  acculturation	  
can	  “Arabize”	  an	  ethnolinguistic	  minority,	  the	  Berber.	  The	  qualifier	  is	  a	  linguistic	  tag:	  an	  
“Arabized	  Berber”	  is	  a	  Berber	  who	  speaks	  Arabic.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  “what	  is	  Arabic?”	  
	  
ARABIC	  LINGUISTICS	  AND	  SOCIOLINGUISTICS	  
In	  the	  pages	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  regular	  readers	  may	  notice	  an	  advertisement	  for	  language	  
training	  materials	  offered	  by	  the	  Connecticut-­‐based	  company	  Audio	  Forum.	  For	  those	  
hoping	  to	  learn	  Arabic	  for	  professional	  reasons,	  including	  practitioners	  of	  international	  
affairs,	  security	  specialists	  and	  journalists,	  those	  who	  read	  the	  ad	  immediately	  confront	  a	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difficult	  question:	  which	  one?	  Because	  the	  company	  sensibly	  develops	  courses	  that	  
emphasize	  “learning	  to	  speak	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  spoken	  language”	  of	  a	  given	  country,	  
the	  company	  offers	  courses	  in	  Iraqi	  Arabic,	  Levantine	  Arabic,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabic,	  but	  not	  
“Arabic.”	  There	  is	  also	  a	  course	  in	  “Modern	  Written	  Arabic,”	  though	  conspicuous	  by	  its	  
absence	  is	  a	  course	  called	  “Modern	  Spoken	  Arabic.”20	  
	  
An	  immediate	  objection	  here	  is	  that	  these	  are	  not	  different	  languages	  but	  rather	  different	  
dialects,	  vernaculars,	  colloquials,	  or	  some	  other	  denomination	  of	  subordinate	  status	  to	  a	  
single,	  superior,	  bona	  fide	  Arabic	  language.	  Yet	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  subordinate	  and	  
dominant	  language	  variety	  is	  determined	  by	  subjective	  social	  status	  rather	  than	  objective	  
empirical	  philology.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  maxim	  most	  often	  attributed	  to	  Max	  Weinreich,	  
a	  language	  is	  a	  dialect	  with	  an	  army	  and	  a	  navy.	  At	  one	  point,	  for	  example,	  there	  was	  a	  
language	  called	  Hindustani	  that	  incorporated	  dialects	  spoken	  by	  different	  Hindu	  and	  
Muslim	  communities:	  these	  dialects	  are	  now	  considered	  separate	  languages,	  Hindi	  and	  
Urdu.	  More	  recently,	  there	  was	  in	  Europe	  a	  language	  called	  Serbo-­‐Croatian:	  no	  longer.	  	  
Serbs	  and	  Croats	  can,	  however,	  communicate,	  and	  in	  this	  regard	  some	  varieties	  of	  Arabic	  
(though	  by	  no	  means	  all)	  are	  more	  or	  less	  mutually	  intelligible.	  Yet	  to	  downgrade	  anyone’s	  
mother	  tongue	  as	  a	  minor	  “dialect”	  rather	  than	  a	  “language”	  is	  an	  exercise	  of	  power,	  not	  
analysis.	  
	  
Making	  more	  precise	  determinations	  of	  how	  different	  one	  language	  is	  from	  another	  
language,	  or	  the	  relative	  levels	  of	  comprehension	  among	  speakers	  of	  different	  Arabics,	  is	  a	  
challenge	  not	  yet	  met	  by	  linguistics.	  As	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  naturally	  spoken	  Arabics	  
and	  what	  is	  called	  “Modern	  Standard	  Arabic”	  or	  MSA	  (more	  on	  this	  term	  in	  a	  moment),	  
Harvard	  linguist	  Wheeler	  M.	  Thackston	  Jr.,	  tellingly	  titled	  “Professor	  of	  the	  Practice	  of	  
Persian	  and	  other	  Near	  Eastern	  Languages,”	  famously	  told	  a	  reporter	  for	  The	  Christian	  
Science	  Monitor	  that,	  even	  for	  Arabs,	  MSA	  “resembles	  what	  they	  grow	  up	  speaking	  at	  home	  
as	  much	  as	  Latin	  resembles	  English.”21	  This	  may	  be	  an	  overstatement,	  but	  his	  point	  is	  clear	  
all	  the	  same.	  
	  
Linguists	  produce	  abundant	  research	  on	  the	  structure	  and	  substance	  of	  many	  different	  
spoken	  Arabic	  languages.	  While	  little	  is	  known	  about	  pre-­‐Islamic	  Arabic,22	  the	  advent	  of	  
Islam	  and	  the	  resulting	  fixity	  of	  fourteen	  centuries	  means	  written	  Arabic	  has	  an	  
exceptionally	  rich,	  well-­‐documented	  heritage	  and	  a	  clear	  trajectory	  from	  the	  seventh	  
                                                
20	  The	  company’s	  website	  (www.audioforum.com,	  accessed	  February	  8,	  2013)	  claims	  many	  
of	  its	  courses	  “were	  developed	  by	  the	  Foreign	  Service	  Institute	  of	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  
State	  for	  diplomatic	  personnel.”	  
21	  Samar	  Farah,	  “So	  You’d	  Like	  to	  Learn	  Arabic.	  Got	  a	  Decade	  or	  So?”	  The	  Christian	  Science	  
Monitor,	  January	  17	  2002.	  
22	  An	  interesting	  exception	  is	  Mary	  Catherine	  Bateson,	  Structural	  Continuity	  in	  Poetry;	  a	  
Linguistic	  Study	  of	  Five	  Pre-­Islamic	  Arabic	  Odes	  (The	  Hague:	  Mouton,	  1970).	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century	  until	  today.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  on	  many	  
varieties	  of	  organic	  spoken	  Arabic	  vernaculars.	  Most	  of	  this	  research	  is	  possible	  only	  
through	  extensive	  fieldwork,	  a	  methodology	  exemplified	  by	  linguists	  such	  as	  Clive	  Holes,	  a	  
renowned	  specialist	  in	  Gulf	  Arabic.23	  Recent	  years	  (since	  2000)	  have	  seen	  the	  publication	  
of	  detailed	  new	  works	  on	  the	  grammar	  and	  lexicons	  of	  Iraqi,	  Algerian,	  Gulf,	  Sudanese,	  and	  
Palestinian	  Arabics.24	  
	  
Languages,	  like	  people,	  are	  conventionally	  sorted	  according	  to	  ancestry	  and	  their	  
membership	  in	  a	  particular	  family.	  Language	  classifications	  use	  a	  Linnaean	  taxonomy	  to	  
identify	  the	  lineage	  and	  relations	  of	  distinct	  ethnolinguistic	  populations.	  The	  standard	  
reference	  for	  these	  classifications	  is	  appropriately	  called	  Ethnologue.25	  Now	  in	  its	  fifteenth	  
edition,	  it	  identifies	  108	  language	  families	  from	  which	  all	  other	  living	  languages—the	  
current	  figure	  of	  “known	  languages”	  is	  6,912—are	  descended.	  Some	  of	  the	  families	  are	  very	  
large,	  such	  as	  the	  449	  members	  of	  the	  Indo-­‐European	  clan,	  or	  the	  staggering	  1,514	  of	  the	  
Niger-­‐Congo	  family,	  while	  others	  live	  in	  near	  isolation:	  the	  Basque	  family	  has	  but	  three	  
surviving	  members.	  Each	  language	  is	  assigned	  a	  unique	  three-­‐letter	  code	  in	  a	  system	  
managed	  by	  the	  International	  Organization	  for	  Standardization	  (ISO),	  the	  Geneva-­‐based	  
body	  that	  determines	  global	  standards	  for	  everything	  from	  the	  distance	  between	  threads	  
on	  sheet-­‐metal	  screws	  to	  the	  coding	  of	  transmission	  signals	  for	  radio	  and	  television	  
broadcasts.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  languages,	  the	  relevant	  body	  of	  standards	  is	  labeled	  ISO	  639.	  This	  
body	  is	  now	  in	  its	  third	  incarnation,	  ISO	  639-­‐3:	  the	  suffix	  indicates	  a	  system	  of	  three-­‐letter	  
coding	  rather	  than	  two-­‐letters	  as	  in	  ISO	  639-­‐2.	  
	  
                                                
23	  Clive	  Holes,	  Colloquial	  Arabic	  of	  the	  Gulf	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia	  (London;	  Boston:	  Routledge	  &	  
Kegan	  Paul,	  1984),	  ———,	  Language	  Variation	  and	  Change	  in	  a	  Modernising	  Arab	  State:	  The	  
Case	  of	  Bahrain,	  Library	  of	  Arabic	  Linguistics;	  Monograph	  No.	  7	  (London;	  New	  York:	  Kegan	  
Paul	  International,	  1987),	  ———,	  Gulf	  Arabic,	  Croom	  Helm	  Descriptive	  Grammars	  Series	  
(London;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1990),	  ———,	  Dialect,	  Culture,	  and	  Society	  in	  Eastern	  
Arabia	  (Leiden;	  Boston:	  Brill,	  2001),	  ———,	  Modern	  Arabic:	  Structures,	  Functions,	  and	  
Varieties,	  Rev.	  ed.,	  Georgetown	  Classics	  in	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  Linguistics	  (Washington,	  
D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
24	  Yasin	  M.	  Al-­‐Khalesi,	  Modern	  Iraqi	  Arabic	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  
2006),	  Elizabeth	  M.	  Bergman,	  Spoken	  Algerian	  Arabic	  (Springfield,	  VA:	  Dunwoody	  Press,	  
2005),	  Habaka	  J.	  Feghali,	  Gulf	  Arabic:	  The	  Dialects	  of	  Riyadh	  and	  Eastern	  Saudi	  Arabic:	  
Grammar,	  Dialogues,	  and	  Lexicon	  (Springfield,	  VA:	  Dunwoody	  Press,	  2004),	  Elizabeth	  M.	  
Bergman,	  Spoken	  Sudanese	  Arabic:	  Grammar,	  Dialogues,	  and	  Glossary	  (Springfield,	  VA:	  
Dunwoody	  Press,	  2002),	  Mohammad	  A.	  Mohammad,	  Word	  Order,	  Agreement,	  and	  
Pronominalization	  in	  Standard	  and	  Palestinian	  Arabic,	  Amsterdam	  Studies	  in	  the	  Theory	  
and	  History	  of	  Linguistic	  Science.	  (Amsterdam;	  Philadelphia:	  J.	  Benjamins	  Pub.	  Co.,	  2000).	  
25	  Raymond	  G.	  Gordon,	  Jr.,	  ed.,	  Ethnologue:	  Languages	  of	  the	  World,	  Fifteenth	  ed.	  (Dallas:	  SIL	  
International,	  2005).	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Arabic,	  like	  Hebrew,	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Semitic	  branch	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asiatic	  family.	  Unlike	  
living	  Hebrew,	  which	  is	  now	  the	  unique	  mother	  tongue	  of	  some	  five	  million	  people,	  
virtually	  all	  in	  the	  Jewish	  nation-­‐state	  Israel,	  Arabic	  is	  fractured	  into	  thirty-­‐five	  varieties	  
dispersed	  across	  dozens	  of	  countries.	  All	  of	  the	  varieties	  are	  mother	  tongues,	  except	  one.	  	  
The	  outlier,	  wonderfully,	  is	  Arabic,	  i.e.	  [Modern]	  Standard	  Arabic.	  	  The	  formal	  classification	  
is	  explicit	  on	  this	  point:	  
	  
Arabic,	  Standard	  
246,000,000	  second-­language	  speakers	  of	  all	  Arabic	  varieties.	  	  Not	  a	  first	  language.	  	  
Used	  for	  education,	  official	  purposes,	  written	  materials,	  and	  formal	  speeches.	  	  Classical	  
Arabic	  is	  used	  for	  religion	  and	  ceremonial	  purposes,	  having	  archaic	  vocabulary.	  	  
Modern	  Standard	  Arabic	  is	  a	  modernized	  variety	  of	  Classical	  Arabic.	  	  In	  most	  Arab	  
countries	  only	  the	  well	  educated	  have	  adequate	  proficiency	  in	  Standard	  Arabic,	  while	  
over	  100,500,000	  do	  not.26	  
	  
Thus,	  if	  we	  apply	  linguistic	  criteria	  to	  the	  current	  question	  “who	  is	  or	  is	  not	  an	  Arab?”	  we	  
must	  accept	  that	  an	  Arab	  is	  a	  native	  speaker	  of	  one	  of	  the	  thirty-­‐four	  living	  vernaculars	  that	  
are	  members	  of	  the	  linguistic	  branch:	  Afro-­Asiatic	  /	  Semitic	  /	  Central	  /	  South	  /	  Arabic.	  
	  
	  
TABLE	  II:	  The	  Arabic	  World	  -­	  Distribution	  of	  Arabic	  








Egyptian	   Egypt	   44,406,00
0	  
46,321,000	  
Algerian	   Algeria	   21,097,00
0	  
21,097,000	  
Moroccan	   Morocco	   18,800,00
0	  
19,480,600	  
Sudanese	  a	   Sudan	   15,000,00
0	  
18,986,000	  





                                                
26	  Ibid.	  
27	  a	  Also	  known	  as	  Khartoum	  Arabic;	  b	  Also	  known	  as	  Western	  Egyptian	  Bedawi	  Spoken;	  c	  
Also	  known	  as	  Hasanya,	  Hassani,	  Hassaniya;	  d	  Also	  known	  as	  Levantine	  Bedawi	  Spoken;	  e	  
Also	  known	  as	  Shuwa	  Arabic;	  f	  The	  living	  Judeo-­‐	  varieties	  of	  Arabic	  are	  spoke	  by	  remnants	  
of	  Jewish	  émigrés	  to	  Israel	  originating	  from	  separate	  language	  communities	  long	  resident	  
in	  Morocco,	  Iraq,	  Yemen,	  Tunisia	  and	  Libya,	  respectively.	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Mesopotamian	   Iraq	   11,500,00
0	  
15,100,000	  
North	  Levantine	   Syria,	  Lebanon	   8,800,000	   14,309,537	  
Najdi	   Saudi	  Arabia	   8,000,000	   9,863,520	  
Tunisian	   Tunisia	   9,000,000	   9,247,800	  
Sanaani	   Yemen	   7,600,000	   7,600,000	  
Ta’izzi-­‐Adeni	   Yemen	   6,760,000	   6,869,000	  
N.	  Mesopotamian	   Iraq	   5,400,000	   6,300,000	  
South	  Levantine	   Jordan,	  
Palestine	  
3,500,000	   6,145,000	  
Hejazi	   Saudi	  Arabia	   6,000,000	   6,000,000	  
Libyan	  b	   Libya	   4,200,000	   4,505,000	  
Hassaniyya	  c	   Mauritania	   2,475,000	   2,787,625	  
Gulf	   Iraq,	  Kuwait,	  
Qatar	  
744,000	   2,338,600	  
E.	  Egyptian	  
Bedawi	  d	  
Egypt	   780,000	   1,610,000	  
Chadian	  e	   Chad	   754,590	   986,190	  
Omani	   Oman	   720,000	   815,000	  
Hadrami	   Yemen	   300,000	   410,000	  
Maltese	   Malta	   300,000	   371,900	  
Baharna	   Bahrain	   300,000	   310,000	  
Judeo-­‐Moroccan	  f	   Israel	   250,000	   258,925	  
Algerian	  Saharan	   Algeria	   110,000	   110,000	  
Judeo-­‐Iraqi	  f	   Israel	   100,000	   100,100	  
Hoary	   Oman	   70,000	   70,000	  
Judeo-­‐Yemeni	  f	   Israel	   50,000	   51,000	  
Judeo-­‐Tunisian	  f	   Israel	   45,000	   45,000	  
Judeo-­‐
Tripolitanian	  f	  
Israel	   30,000	   35,000	  
Shihhi	   UAE	   5,000	   27,000	  
Tajiki	   Afghanistan	   5,000	   6,000	  
Cypriot	   Cyprus	   1,300	   1,300	  
Uzbeki	   Uzbekistan	   700	   700	  




Standard	  Arabic	  -­	  Second	  
Language	  (including	  
Arabs	  but	  also	  Berbers,	  




Proficient	   Total	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Arabic,	  Standard	   131,000,000	  
105,000,
000	   246,000,0
00	  Total	  Speakers,	  Standard	  Arabic	  -­	  Second	  
Language	  
Adapted	  by	  the	  author	  from	  Raymond	  G.	  Gordon,	  Jr.,	  ed.,	  
Ethnologue:	  Languages	  of	  the	  World,	  Fifteenth	  ed.	  (Dallas:	  SIL	  
International,	  2005).	  	  
	  
With	  High	  Arabic	  as	  the	  only	  official	  language,	  it	  could	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  other	  thirty-­‐
four	  species	  are	  dialects,	  a	  speech	  variety	  that	  may	  be	  “functionally	  intelligible	  to	  each	  
other’s	  speakers	  because	  of	  linguistic	  similarity”	  to	  one	  common	  language	  called	  Modern	  
Standard	  Arabic.28	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  While	  some	  Arabic	  varieties	  are,	  as	  dyads,	  more	  
similar	  than	  others,	  especially	  those	  nearer	  geographically,	  the	  thirty-­‐four	  living	  varieties	  
of	  Arabic	  are	  often	  distinguished	  easily	  because	  many	  are	  not	  functionally	  intelligible.	  Why	  
is	  this	  case?	  Like	  ancient	  Hebrew	  writings,	  Arabic	  texts	  maintained	  a	  remarkable	  
consistency	  over	  the	  centuries	  as	  the	  classical	  language	  was	  protected	  from	  the	  vagaries	  of	  
time	  and	  territory.	  Unlike	  liturgical	  Hebrew	  and	  unlike	  liturgical	  Arabic,	  living	  spoken	  
Arabic	  continued	  to	  evolve,	  naturally,	  along	  ethnic	  and	  regional	  lines.	  For	  a	  traveller	  on	  the	  
road	  from	  Marrakech	  to	  Muscat,	  asking	  for	  directions	  grows	  more	  difficult	  with	  each	  
passing	  kilometer	  as	  vernaculars	  diverge	  across	  a	  language	  continuum.	  
	  
Classical	  Arabic	  is	  essentially	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Quran,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  identical	  as	  
the	  holy	  text	  employs	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  stylizations	  and	  formulations	  that	  are	  distinct	  
from	  non-­‐liturgical	  texts.	  Moreover,	  the	  Islamic	  doctrine	  of	  ijaz,	  or	  divine	  inimitability,	  
prohibits	  attempted	  imitation	  of	  the	  sacred	  text	  of	  the	  holy	  book,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sirfa	  
principle,	  which	  stipulates	  that	  even	  exceptional	  persons	  who	  may	  successfully	  imitate	  the	  
language	  invite	  the	  wrath	  of	  God.	  This	  language	  calls	  itself	  fusha,	  a	  term	  that	  “designates	  the	  
ideas	  of	  purity,	  clarity,	  eloquence,	  chastity	  and	  freedom	  from	  speech	  impediments.”	  As	  
such,	  this	  term	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  classification:	  it	  is	  a	  normative	  label	  that	  reflects	  a	  
number	  of	  “moral	  dimensions.”29	  In	  practice	  (and,	  obviously,	  in	  English),	  this	  written	  and	  
rationalized	  form	  of	  the	  language	  is	  called	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic	  (MSA)	  or	  sometimes	  
simply	  Standard	  Arabic	  (SA).	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  translation	  of	  MSA	  or	  SA	  in	  
High	  Arabic,	  fusha	  is	  actually	  the	  right	  term,	  but	  the	  abbreviation	  MSA	  is	  most	  conventional	  
and	  employed	  here.	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  unmodified	  word	  “Arabic”	  this,	  depending	  on	  context,	  may	  either	  be	  shorthand	  
for	  Classical	  Arabic	  or	  Standard	  Arabic	  or	  refer	  to	  all	  Arabics.	  Arabic	  is	  classified	  by	  ISO	  
639-­‐3	  as	  a	  macrolanguage.	  In	  this	  case,	  each	  language	  is	  assigned	  a	  three-­‐letter	  code—for	  
                                                
28	  Gordon,	  ed.,	  Ethnologue:	  Languages	  of	  the	  World.	  
29	  Yasir	  Suleiman,	  A	  War	  of	  Words:	  Language	  and	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Cambridge	  
Middle	  East	  Studies;	  19	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  p.	  58.	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example,	  Algerian	  Arabic	  is	  ARQ	  and	  Egyptian	  Arabic	  is	  ARZ—but	  the	  Arabics	  in	  toto	  are	  
also	  assigned	  a	  generic	  code	  as	  a	  macrolanguage,	  i.e.	  ARA.30	  Another	  good	  example	  of	  a	  
macrolanguage	  is	  Chinese:	  while	  most	  varieties	  share	  the	  same	  writing	  system,	  different	  
languages	  such	  as	  Cantonese,	  Shanghainese	  and	  Taiwanese	  (Hakka)	  are	  not	  mutually	  
intelligible.	  In	  any	  case,	  whether	  considered	  fusha,	  Classical,	  SA	  or	  MSA,	  this	  language—in	  
both	  its	  written	  and	  spoken	  forms—must	  be	  acquired	  through	  years	  of	  formal	  education.	  
	  
If	  Arabic	  is	  a	  macrolanguage,	  then	  it	  may	  be	  suggested	  that	  the	  dozens	  of	  other	  Arabic	  
tongues	  are	  microlanguages.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  misleading	  and	  unhelpful,	  but	  also	  silly.	  At	  
least	  one	  in	  four	  Arabs	  is	  a	  native	  speaker	  of	  Egyptian	  Arabic.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  nothing	  
microscopic	  about	  Algerian	  Arabic	  (25.2	  million)	  or	  Moroccan	  Arabic	  (22.6	  million).	  
Though	  the	  term	  “microlanguage”	  is	  not	  useful	  here,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  need	  to	  parse	  precisely	  
what	  more	  specific	  language	  labels	  mean.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Morocco,	  we	  may	  say	  that	  
Moroccan	  Arabic	  is	  a	  genetic	  descendant	  of	  the	  Arabic	  family	  and	  a	  living	  member	  of	  the	  
macrolanguage	  Arabic.	  But	  as	  for	  the	  general	  classification	  of	  Arabic	  mother	  tongues	  across	  
multiple	  states,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  unequal	  and	  competing	  terms.	  In	  MSA,	  the	  term	  for	  
non-­‐MSA	  spoken	  Arabic	  is	  ammiyya	  or	  “common”	  language.31	  In	  linguistics	  and	  
sociolinguistics,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potentially	  appropriate	  terms,	  including	  dialect,	  
colloquial,	  vernacular,	  and	  demotic.	  While	  dialect	  is	  often	  used	  in	  reference	  to	  ammiyya,	  
this	  is	  (again)	  a	  socially	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  status.	  Colloquial,	  from	  the	  Latin	  word	  for	  
“speaking”	  (loquium),	  describes	  quotidian	  conversation,	  neither	  formal	  nor	  informal	  but	  
ordinary	  and	  pedestrian.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  appropriate	  insofar	  as	  ammiyya	  Arabics	  are	  spoken	  but	  rarely	  written,	  yet	  this	  term	  
is	  often	  interpreted	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  slang,	  typically	  understood	  to	  describe	  the	  style	  of	  
a	  word	  or	  phrase	  rather	  than	  an	  entire	  language.32	  Vernacular,	  from	  the	  Latin	  for	  native	  or	  
indigenous	  (vernaculus)	  certainly	  is	  appropriate	  as	  all	  ammiyya	  are	  mother	  tongues	  
learned	  organically	  by	  children	  from	  their	  parents	  and	  family.	  However,	  because	  
vernacular	  can	  also	  describe	  spoken	  languages	  that	  are	  “characteristic	  of	  non-­‐dominant	  
                                                
30	  Judeo-­‐Arabic	  languages	  are	  noted	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  varieties	  of	  “Arabic”	  because	  they	  are	  
classified	  genetically	  under	  the	  branch	  Afro-­Asiatic/Semitic/Central/South/Arabic.	  	  They	  
are	  not,	  however,	  included	  among	  the	  thirty	  languages	  incorporated	  into	  the	  
macrolanguage	  Arabic	  [ARA].	  	  Instead,	  they	  are	  aggregated	  under	  a	  separate	  
macrolanguage	  code,	  Judeo-­‐Arabic	  [JRB].	  
31	  Alternate	  transliterations	  from	  Arabic	  include	  ‘amiya	  and	  ‘amiyya.	  	  The	  language	  may	  
also	  be	  called	  by	  the	  name	  of	  the	  people	  who	  speak	  it,	  such	  as	  Masri,	  meaning	  “Egyptian.”	  
32	  Rather	  exceptionally,	  the	  Egyptian	  ammiyya	  of	  Cairo	  is	  written	  if	  the	  context	  is	  informal,	  
such	  as	  advertising,	  cartoon	  captions,	  song	  lyrics,	  etc.	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groups	  or	  classes”	  this	  is	  politically	  problematic	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Arabic.33	  In	  all	  Arab-­‐defined	  
states,	  all	  Arabs—dominant	  or	  non-­‐dominant—are	  native	  speakers	  of	  a	  particular	  
vernacular	  Arabic.	  In	  certain	  contexts,	  one	  vernacular	  may	  be	  more	  dominant	  politically	  
than	  another.	  In	  Jordan,	  for	  example,	  speakers	  of	  the	  native	  Bedouin	  or	  urbane	  Medani	  
vernaculars	  rank	  higher	  than	  the	  Fallahi	  variety,	  which	  is	  associated	  particularly	  with	  
Palestinian	  refugees	  ejected	  from	  their	  homes	  in	  1948	  and	  1967.34	  But	  all	  these	  
vernaculars	  are	  considered	  impure	  when	  compared	  with	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic.	  Though	  
MSA	  is	  now	  the	  vernacular	  of	  nobody,	  it	  remains	  the	  language	  of	  a	  great	  High	  culture	  
heritage	  and	  a	  most	  sacred	  book,	  the	  Quran.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  contrast	  to	  fusha,	  all	  
ammiyya	  are	  stigmatized.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  mean	  that	  all	  ammiyya	  are	  of	  equal	  
status:	  Cairenes	  make	  fun	  of	  Saidi	  speakers	  from	  Upper	  Egypt,	  Gulf	  Arabs	  deride	  Lebanese	  
speech	  as	  effeminate,	  the	  Lebanese	  find	  Gulf	  Arabic	  harsh,	  etc.	  
	  
This	  leaves	  the	  term	  demotic,	  a	  term	  immediately	  recognizable	  for	  sharing	  the	  same	  
classical	  Greek	  root	  as	  democracy,	  demos,	  meaning	  “the	  people.”	  Linguists,	  however,	  more	  
often	  associate	  the	  term	  demotic	  with	  Modern	  Greek.	  Before	  1976,	  the	  official	  language	  of	  
Greece	  was	  Katharevousa	  (pure)	  Greek,	  a	  written	  from	  standardized	  in	  Athens	  following	  
the	  (Russian-­‐aided)	  ejection	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Turks	  in	  1828.	  Seeking	  to	  purge	  foreign	  
elements	  from	  the	  language,	  this	  literary	  form	  drew	  heavily	  on	  the	  classical	  language	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  the	  vernacular(s).	  Like	  Standard	  Arabic,	  Katharevousa	  Greek	  existed	  only	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  education,	  while	  the	  demos	  continued	  to	  speak	  their	  Demotic	  Greek.	  The	  two	  
varieties,	  called	  “High”	  and	  “Low”	  forms	  respectively,	  came	  into	  conflict	  in	  the	  1880’s	  when	  
a	  modernizing	  “bourgeois	  movement”	  fought	  for	  “spoken	  Greek	  in	  the	  name	  of	  economic	  
progress,	  social	  reforms,	  education	  for	  all,	  and	  the	  assimilation	  of	  linguistic	  minorities.”35	  
Despite	  decades	  of	  sociolinguistic	  tension,	  Katharevousa	  remained	  the	  official	  language	  of	  
Greece	  until	  1976,	  when	  a	  recently	  established	  (1974)	  democratic	  regime	  elevated	  Demotic	  
Greek	  with	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  national	  language	  of	  Greece	  is	  now	  considered	  
a	  combination	  of	  these	  forms	  known	  as	  Koini	  Neoelliniki	  (Pan-­‐Hellenic	  Demotic	  Greek)	  or,	  
more	  simply,	  Standard	  Greek.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  I	  adopt	  the	  term	  demotic	  Arabic	  to	  
describe	  spoken	  Arabic	  languages	  in	  general.	  This	  is	  especially	  appropriate	  because	  Greek	  
and	  Arabic	  share	  the	  rare	  experience	  of	  modern	  diglossia,	  i.e.	  the	  stable,	  simultaneous,	  and	  
parallel	  existence	  of	  High	  and	  Low	  language	  varieties	  separated	  by	  social	  status	  and	  
                                                
33	  Peter	  H.	  Matthews,	  The	  Concise	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  Linguistics	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1997).	  	  Cf.	  William	  Labov,	  Language	  in	  the	  Inner	  City;	  Studies	  in	  the	  Black	  
English	  Vernacular	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  1972).	  
34	  See	  Chapter	  4	  -­‐	  “When	  dialects	  collide:	  language	  and	  conflict	  in	  Jordan”	  -­‐	  of	  Suleiman,	  A	  
War	  of	  Words:	  Language	  and	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
35	  Anna	  Frangoudaki,	  “Greek	  Societal	  Bilingualism	  of	  More	  Than	  a	  Century,”	  International	  
Journal	  of	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Language	  157	  (2002):	  p.	  101.	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political	  context.36	  What	  makes	  diglossia	  distinct	  from	  a	  language/dialect	  scenario,	  wherein	  
the	  High	  form	  of	  the	  language	  is	  also	  the	  mother	  tongue	  of	  an	  economically,	  culturally,	  or	  
politically	  dominant	  group,	  the	  High	  form	  of	  a	  diglossic	  language	  must	  be	  acquired	  
“through	  education”	  and	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  vernacular	  anywhere.37	  
	  
The	  effects	  of	  diglossia	  in	  contemporary	  Egypt	  are	  illustrated	  vividly	  in	  Niloofar	  Haeri’s	  
Sacred	  Language,	  Ordinary	  People	  (2003).	  With	  exacting	  terminology,	  she	  observes	  that	  
Egyptian	  Arabic	  “unquestionably	  defines	  an	  Egyptian	  identity	  and	  a	  national	  identity”	  yet	  is	  
paradoxically	  trivialized	  by	  the	  state.38	  She	  asks	  questions	  that	  are	  stunning	  in	  their	  
simplicity:	  “Why	  isn’t	  Egyptian	  Arabic	  the	  medium	  of	  education?	  ...	  Why	  is	  citizenship	  in	  
part	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  language	  that	  is	  no	  one’s	  mother	  tongue?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  
have	  a	  divine	  language	  as	  the	  official	  language	  of	  a	  state?”39	  These	  are	  current	  questions	  so	  
fundamental	  to	  the	  study	  of	  society	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  that	  it	  is	  unfathomable	  
how	  they	  remain	  largely	  unasked	  (and	  unanswered)	  in	  political	  science	  especially;	  in	  fact,	  
the	  silence	  is	  deafening.40	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  outside	  Anglophone	  academia	  many	  
Egyptian	  and	  Arab	  writers	  do	  not	  engage	  such	  questions—they	  do,	  frequently	  and	  
vociferously—but	  these	  authors	  remain	  in	  the	  margins.41	  
	  
ARABIC	  AND	  NATIONALISM	  
Within	  the	  Arab	  world,	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  role	  of	  demotic	  versus	  Classical	  Arabic	  began	  in	  
earnest	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  But	  first	  it	  must	  be	  asked	  why	  separate	  Arabic	  
vernaculars	  had	  not	  developed	  into	  literate	  forms	  in	  the	  same	  fashion	  as	  separate	  Germanic	  
and	  Romance	  languages	  had	  developed	  in	  Europe	  or	  Turkic	  languages	  had	  developed	  in	  
Anatolia	  and	  beyond.	  On	  this	  point,	  there	  is	  much	  agreement,	  even	  among	  scholars	  who	  
may	  otherwise	  find	  little	  in	  common:	  Classical	  Arabic,	  i.e.	  fusha,	  is	  sacred.	  Hence,	  the	  status	  
of	  its	  contemporary	  form,	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic,	  is	  supreme.	  
                                                
36	  A	  third	  example	  is	  Tamil.	  	  The	  seminal	  work	  on	  Tamil	  diglossia,	  including	  a	  foreword	  by	  
Charles	  A.	  Ferguson,	  is	  Francis	  Britto,	  Diglossia:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Theory	  with	  Application	  to	  
Tamil	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  1986).	  
37	  Matthews,	  The	  Concise	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  Linguistics.	  
38	  Niloofar	  Haeri,	  Sacred	  Language,	  Ordinary	  People:	  Dilemmas	  of	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  in	  
Egypt	  (New	  York:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2003),	  p.	  37.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  p.	  x.	  
40	  In	  what	  is	  now	  a	  standard	  reference	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  Arab	  nationalism,	  Jankowski	  and	  
Gershoni’s	  collection	  of	  fourteen	  essays	  includes	  a	  mention	  of	  language	  as	  a	  political	  
problematic	  in	  the	  states	  of	  the	  region,	  though	  it	  is	  nothing	  if	  not	  brief,	  and	  even	  this	  aside	  
reduces	  to	  diglossia	  to	  nothing	  more	  than	  “a	  sore	  spot	  of	  Arabism	  in	  the	  past.”	  	  Emmanual	  
Sivan,	  “Arab	  Nationalism	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Resurgence,”	  in	  Rethinking	  Nationalism	  in	  
the	  Arab	  Middle	  East,	  ed.	  James	  P.	  Jankowski	  and	  Israel	  Gershoni	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  
University	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  210.	  
41	  Haeri,	  Sacred	  Language,	  Ordinary	  People:	  Dilemmas	  of	  Culture	  and	  Politics	  in	  Egypt,	  p.	  xii.	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Yasir	  Suleiman,	  a	  native	  Palestinian	  and	  Arabic	  linguist	  at	  Cambridge	  University,	  puts	  it	  this	  
way:	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  Qur’an,	  Islam’s	  primary	  sacral	  text,	  was	  in	  Arabic	  acted	  as	  a	  
centripetal	  force	  of	  internal	  cohesion	  on	  the	  linguistic	  front,	  unlike	  in	  Europe	  where	  
the	  Latin	  Bible	  was	  the	  source	  of	  centrifugal	  vernacularization.	  Furthermore,	  whereas	  
the	  Latin	  Bible,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  antiquity	  and	  textual	  authority,	  was	  essentially	  a	  
translation,	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  not.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Qur’an	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  word	  of	  God	  
verbatim	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  (is)	  considered	  untranslatable.42	  
	  
Because	  Latin	  was	  the	  language	  of	  the	  Bible	  and	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  its	  status	  was	  
unmatched	  until	  the	  advent	  of	  commercial	  printing	  and	  market	  demand	  for	  books	  written	  
in	  a	  language	  many	  more	  people	  could	  understand,	  viz.	  their	  own	  language.	  Yet	  this	  is	  not	  
to	  say	  that	  Latin	  was	  ever	  considered	  divine.	  The	  Christian	  Bible	  is	  explicit	  on	  this	  point.	  It	  
is	  the	  message	  that	  matters	  more	  than	  the	  medium.	  In	  many	  ways,	  for	  observant	  Arab	  
Muslims	  past	  and	  present,	  the	  medium	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  message.	  While	  there	  is	  no	  
debate	  on	  the	  exquisite	  sophistication	  and	  eloquence	  of	  Classical	  Arabic,	  its	  immutability	  
and	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  is	  often	  considered	  a	  liability—a	  competitive	  
disadvantage—in	  an	  age	  of	  industrialization,	  modernization,	  and	  globalization.	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  Bernard	  Lewis	  shares	  this	  view:	  “unlike	  the	  peoples	  of	  Western	  Europe,	  who	  
threw	  off	  the	  bonds	  of	  bad	  Latin	  and	  raised	  their	  vernaculars	  to	  the	  level	  of	  literary	  
languages,	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  are	  still	  hampered	  by	  the	  constraints	  of	  diglossy	  
[sic]	  and	  of	  an	  increasingly	  archaic	  and	  artificial	  medium	  of	  communication.”43	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  Arabs,	  the	  ideology	  of	  pan-­‐Arabism	  formulated	  by	  a	  principal	  nationalist	  
progenitor,	  Sati	  al-­‐Husri	  (1879-­‐1967),	  ultimately	  cemented	  the	  place	  of	  Classical	  Arabic	  in	  
Arab	  states.	  When	  stating,	  “every	  Arab-­‐speaking	  people	  is	  an	  Arab	  people,”	  Arabic	  for	  al-­‐
Husri	  simply	  meant	  Classical	  Arabic.	  This	  is	  ironic	  considering	  his	  explicit	  point	  about	  
“Arabic-­‐speaking”	  which	  would	  necessarily	  mean	  a	  demotic	  Arabic.	  In	  his	  view,	  naturally	  
spoken	  Arabic	  languages	  were	  dismissed	  as	  “so-­‐called	  nation-­‐state	  dialects,”	  and	  
considered	  corruptions	  to	  be	  corrected.44	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  obvious	  hurdle	  that	  few	  people	  
could	  actually	  speak,	  read	  or	  write	  Classical	  Arabic,	  the	  language(s)	  of	  “Arab-­‐speaking	  
people”	  was	  “not	  living	  Arabic;	  it	  was	  just	  incorrect	  Arabic.”	  Clearly,	  there	  was	  an	  
immediate	  and	  obvious	  political	  need	  to	  stifle	  any	  and	  all	  challenges	  to	  Classical	  Arabic:	  “If	  
the	  Egyptians,	  the	  Syrians,	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  the	  rest	  were	  to	  develop	  their	  vernaculars	  into	  
national	  languages,	  as	  the	  Spaniards,	  the	  Italians	  and	  the	  rest	  had	  done	  in	  Europe,	  then	  all	  
                                                
42	  Suleiman,	  The	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Study	  in	  Ideology,	  p.	  35.	  
43	  Bernard	  Lewis,	  The	  Multiple	  Identities	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  Weidenfeld	  &	  Nicolson,	  
1998),	  p.	  51.	  
44	  Suleiman,	  The	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Study	  in	  Ideology,	  p.	  142.	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hope	  of	  a	  greater	  Arab	  unity	  would	  be	  finally	  lost.”45	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  the	  
public	  use	  of	  distinct	  vernaculars	  has	  no	  political	  utility.	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  speeches	  by	  
Egypt’s	  Nasser,	  Iraq’s	  Saddam	  Hussein	  and	  Libya’s	  Muammar	  Qaddafi,	  Nathalie	  Mazraani,	  a	  
Cambridge-­‐trained	  Arabic	  linguist,	  observed	  that	  Classical	  Arabic	  was	  employed	  
consistently	  when	  “constructing	  an	  abstract	  argument,	  recalling	  historical	  events,	  
expanding	  new	  political	  ideas	  and	  axioms”	  but	  that	  vernacular	  Arabic	  proved	  useful	  when	  a	  
leader	  explained	  the	  details	  of	  “his	  political	  program,	  his	  conversations	  with	  various	  
leaders,	  or	  his	  personal	  experience.”46	  
	  
Yet	  the	  selective	  use	  of	  vernacular	  Arabic	  by	  a	  head	  of	  state	  is	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  state	  support.	  
Moreover,	  the	  endorsement	  of	  High	  Arabic	  cut	  across	  social	  and	  political	  cleavages,	  uniting	  
secular	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalists	  with	  all	  manner	  of	  imams.	  To	  separate	  Arab	  peoples	  by	  their	  
many	  demotic	  languages	  would	  mean	  to	  separate	  the	  Arabs	  from	  their	  one	  divine	  language:	  
	  
since	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  achieve	  this	  separation	  without	  causing	  a	  rupture	  within	  
Islam,	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  religious	  identity	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Arabic-­speakers,	  any	  
attempt	  to	  replace	  the	  standard	  by	  the	  colloquial	  as	  the	  marker	  of	  a	  particular	  
territorial	  nationalism	  is	  inevitably	  met	  with	  religious	  opposition.47	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  attempts	  were	  not	  made:	  there	  were	  many.	  Suleiman’s	  Arabic	  Language	  
and	  National	  Identity,	  a	  detailed	  history	  of	  Arabic	  language	  politics,	  shows	  that	  proponents	  
of	  language	  reform	  rejected	  Standard	  Arabic	  for	  two	  reasons:	  either	  the	  language	  was	  seen	  
as	  an	  impediment	  to	  modernization	  or	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  an	  ethnonational	  identity	  (or	  
both).48	  Early	  proposed	  solutions	  to	  the	  perceived	  predicament	  included	  scrapping	  Arabic	  
in	  favor	  of	  some	  other	  language	  of	  education	  and	  commerce	  (usually	  English),	  updating	  
Classical	  Arabic	  with	  more	  contemporary	  vocabulary	  and	  simplified	  grammar,	  or	  simply	  
standardizing	  the	  vernacular.	  
	  
At	  the	  extreme,	  Classical	  Arabic	  was	  seen	  to	  not	  only	  impede	  the	  development	  of	  a	  country	  
and	  its	  people,	  but	  to	  degrade	  them.	  This	  was	  the	  view	  of	  Egyptian	  (and	  Coptic)	  writer	  
Salama	  Musa	  (1887-­‐1958).	  Because	  the	  orthodox	  language	  was	  “steeped	  in	  the	  desert	  
ethos,”	  he	  argued,	  this	  “was	  responsible	  for	  many	  of	  the	  uncivilized	  practices	  found	  in	  
Egyptian	  society,	  including	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘honor	  killings’	  of	  women	  for	  pre-­‐marital	  sex.”	  
Moreover,	  the	  duality	  of	  fusha	  and	  ammiyya	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  pathology:	  	  
“the	  existence	  of	  diglossia	  in	  Arabic	  is	  said	  to	  create	  a	  kind	  of	  linguistic	  schizophrenia,	  
                                                
45	  Lewis,	  The	  Multiple	  Identities	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  p.	  52.	  
46	  Nathalie	  Mazraani,	  Aspects	  of	  Language	  Variation	  in	  Arabic	  Political	  Speech-­Making	  
(Richmond,	  Surrey:	  Curzon	  Press,	  1997),	  p.	  189.	  
47	  Suleiman,	  The	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Study	  in	  Ideology,	  p.	  10.	  
48	  See	  Chapter	  2	  “Language,	  power	  and	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East”	  in	  Suleiman,	  A	  War	  of	  
Words:	  Language	  and	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	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whereby	  Arabic	  speakers	  think	  in	  one	  medium	  (the	  colloquial)	  and	  encode	  their	  thoughts	  
in	  another	  (the	  standard).	  	  The	  pursuit	  of	  ornate	  style	  in	  Arabic	  is	  said	  to	  encourage	  
excellence	  in	  form	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  excellence	  in	  content.”49	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  artistic	  expression,	  another	  Egyptian	  Copt,	  poet	  Lewis	  Awad,	  argued	  Classical	  
Arabic	  is	  “foreign	  to	  Egypt”	  and	  that	  this	  explains	  “the	  inability	  of	  the	  Egyptians	  to	  produce	  
great	  poetry	  in	  the	  language.”50	  As	  a	  leading	  advocate	  of	  writing	  in	  demotic	  Arabic,	  he	  puts	  
himself	  in	  the	  company	  of	  both	  Mark	  Twain—in	  The	  Adventures	  of	  Tom	  Sawyer	  the	  words	  
of	  his	  characters	  are	  transcribed	  from	  the	  vernacular,	  i.e.	  “yellow”	  is	  “yaller”	  and	  “licorice”	  
is	  “lickrish”—and	  the	  Quebecois	  playwright	  Michel	  Tremblay.51	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  Egyptian	  
novelists,	  poets,	  lyricists,	  cartoonists,	  and	  marketers	  can	  print	  text	  in	  Cairene	  Arabic.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  first	  novel	  written	  in	  Egyptian	  Arabic,	  Zaynab,	  was	  published	  in	  1913,	  though	  it	  
is	  telling	  that	  the	  author,	  Mohammad	  Husayn	  Haykal	  (1888-­‐1956),	  adopted	  a	  nom	  de	  
plume.	  	  	  
	  
A	  century	  later,	  the	  premier	  status	  of	  MSA	  is	  unmatched.	  Even	  though	  most	  people	  “rarely	  
use	  it	  in	  everyday	  speech”	  this	  does	  not	  “undermine	  the	  symbolic	  status	  of	  the	  language	  for	  
most	  Arabic-­‐speakers.”52	  High	  Arabic	  continues	  to	  function	  as	  the	  sole	  language	  of	  modern	  
communication	  for	  public,	  political,	  and	  commercial	  affairs	  in	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  East.	  Outside	  
the	  Arab	  region,	  the	  role	  of	  High	  Arabic	  in	  Muslim-­‐majority	  countries	  is	  easier	  to	  
understand:	  normally	  it	  is	  neither	  the	  official	  tongue	  of	  the	  state	  nor	  the	  national	  tongue	  
(viz.	  the	  mother	  tongue)	  of	  the	  population.	  As	  such,	  Classical	  Arabic	  remains	  a	  liturgical	  
language	  of	  little	  use	  in	  a	  non-­‐Arab	  society,	  even	  if	  that	  society	  also	  adheres	  to	  Islam.	  Even	  
instrumental	  attempts	  to	  unite	  disparate	  Muslims	  by	  promoting	  the	  language	  failed.	  
Pakistan	  considered	  endorsing	  the	  sacred	  language	  of	  Muslims,	  Arabic,	  to	  unite	  the	  polyglot	  
populations	  of	  what	  was	  then	  (pre-­‐1971)	  East	  and	  West	  Pakistan.	  The	  idea	  was	  dropped	  
when	  the	  government	  of	  Pakistan	  “realized	  the	  impracticability	  of	  using	  Arabic	  as	  an	  
official	  or	  national	  language	  because	  nobody,	  not	  even	  the	  religious	  scholars,	  could	  actually	  
use	  it.”53	  Correspondingly,	  Arabic	  is	  not	  an	  official	  language	  in	  any	  of	  the	  non-­‐Arab	  
countries	  where	  most	  Muslims	  live,	  including	  Indonesia	  (Bahasa	  Indonesia),	  Bangladesh	  
                                                
49	  Ibid.,	  p.	  43.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  p.	  79.	  
51	  Tremblay’s	  first	  play,	  Les	  Belles-­Sœurs	  (1965),	  introduced	  a	  broader	  public	  to	  the	  spoken	  
language	  of	  Québec.	  	  Named	  joual	  after	  the	  vernacular	  pronunciation	  of	  the	  French	  word	  
cheval	  (horse),	  the	  celebration	  of	  Tremblay’s	  work	  heightened	  the	  sense	  of	  Québécois	  
national	  identity	  that	  bloomed	  in	  the	  Quiet	  Revolution	  (Révolution	  Tranquille)	  of	  the	  1960s.	  
52	  Yasir	  Suleiman,	  The	  Arabic	  Language	  and	  National	  Identity:	  a	  study	  in	  ideology	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  p.	  10.	  
53	  Tariq	  Rahman,	  Language,	  Ideology	  and	  Power:	  Language	  Learning	  among	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  Muslims	  of	  
Pakistan	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  North	  India	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  Oxford	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(Bengali),	  Pakistan	  (Urdu),	  Turkey	  (Turkish),	  and	  Iran	  (Persian).54	  In	  fact,	  the	  only	  non-­‐
Arab-­‐majority	  countries	  to	  endorse	  Arabic	  as	  an	  official	  language	  are	  Comoros	  and	  Israel.	  
	  
ARAB	  DIGLOSSIA	  AND	  ARAB	  DINATIONALISM	  
It	  is	  a	  tantalizing	  thought	  experiment	  to	  imagine	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Arab	  
world	  if	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  region	  had	  dispersed	  socially	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  
“Occidental”	  Europeans	  after	  Gutenberg,	  or	  the	  “Orientals”	  following	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  empire.	  In	  this	  imagined	  scenario,	  each	  separate	  state	  would	  have	  based	  its	  
sovereignty	  and	  its	  borders	  on	  the	  doctrine	  of	  national	  self-­‐determination:	  a	  state	  is	  
legitimate	  because	  it	  exists	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  a	  nation,	  i.e.	  a	  unique	  people	  demanding	  
self-­‐rule.	  Instead,	  there	  exists	  a	  conglomeration	  of	  autocratic	  states	  nominally	  sharing	  the	  
same	  “pan-­‐Arab”	  nationality	  and	  its	  language,	  High	  Arabic.	  It	  is	  this	  link	  of	  pan-­‐Arab	  
nationalism	  and	  an	  acquired	  language—a	  medium	  of	  literacy,	  High	  culture,	  and	  social	  
mobility—that	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  predicament	  of	  erstwhile	  Arab	  nation-­‐states.	  
The	  sanctity	  and	  corresponding	  status	  of	  High	  Arabic	  is	  the	  principal	  impediment	  to	  the	  
elevation,	  reformation,	  and	  standardization	  of	  demotic	  Arabics.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  retards	  the	  
growth	  of	  separate	  ethnolinguistic	  identities	  and	  stymies	  the	  emergence	  of	  distinct	  
ethnonational	  communities	  that	  claim	  sovereignty	  over	  a	  titular	  and	  unique	  nation-­‐state.	  	  
Instead,	  these	  communities	  are	  citizens	  of	  ill-­‐defined	  “Arab”	  states.	  
	  
The	  above,	  of	  course,	  is	  a	  generalization.	  Detailing	  the	  particulars	  of	  each	  people	  and	  each	  
state	  is	  the	  mandate	  of	  dedicated	  area	  experts.	  Yet	  the	  general	  demise	  of	  pan-­‐Arab	  
nationalism	  has	  spurred	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  to	  pen	  obituaries	  of	  a	  failed	  ideology,	  eulogies	  
for	  the	  death	  of	  Nasser’s	  dream,	  begging	  the	  question	  what	  can,	  should,	  or	  will	  take	  its	  
place?	  In	  2003,	  political	  scientist	  Adeed	  Dawisha,	  a	  native	  of	  Iraq,	  described	  the	  trajectory	  
of	  Arab	  nationalism	  “from	  triumph	  to	  despair.”55	  Some	  academics	  view	  this	  analysis	  as	  a	  
hostile	  “demonization”	  of	  a	  “profoundly	  important	  and	  evolving	  political	  force,”	  while	  
others	  may	  claim	  vindication.56	  Franck	  Salameh,	  writing	  in	  the	  first	  French	  issue	  of	  Middle	  
East	  Review	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  equates	  the	  origins	  of	  pan-­‐Arabism	  with	  the	  Aryan	  
ideals	  of	  Nazis	  in	  the	  1930s,	  “engouements	  desquels	  s’étaient	  imprégnés	  Sati	  al-­Housri,	  
Michel	  Aflak	  et	  tous	  leurs	  compagnons	  de	  route	  arabisants”	  [whose	  passions	  had	  
impregnated	  Sati	  al-­‐Housri,	  Michel	  Aflak	  and	  all	  their	  Arabist	  traveling	  companions.]57	  	  	  
                                                
54	  For	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  identity	  in	  Iran,	  see	  Shahrokh	  Meskoob	  
and	  John	  R.	  Perry,	  Iranian	  Nationality	  and	  the	  Persian	  Language,	  ed.	  John	  R.	  Perry,	  trans.	  Ali	  
Banuazizi	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Mage	  Publishers,	  1992).	  	  Cf.	  Kaveh	  Farokh,	  “Book	  Review:	  
Iranian	  Nationality	  and	  the	  Persian	  Language,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  the	  Sociology	  of	  
Language	  148	  (2001).	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(Princeton,	  N.J.:	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  University	  Press,	  2003).	  
56	  R.	  M.	  Coury,	  “The	  Demonisation	  of	  Pan-­‐Arab	  Nationalism,”	  Race	  &	  Class	  46,	  no.	  4	  (2005).	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In	  the	  decades	  since	  the	  1959	  introduction	  of	  Ferguson’s	  diglossia,	  the	  duality	  of	  MSA	  as	  a	  
High	  language	  and	  demotic	  Arabics	  as	  devalued	  Low	  languages	  has	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  
anthropological,	  sociological	  and	  linguistic	  research,	  but	  generally	  not	  a	  topic	  of	  interest	  in	  
political	  science.	  The	  grand	  exception	  to	  this	  rule	  is	  Ernest	  Gellner,	  and	  his	  specific	  
argument,	  first	  suggested	  in	  1964	  and	  later	  developed	  at	  length,	  that	  High	  culture	  in	  the	  
Arab	  world	  means	  Islam.	  In	  this	  view,	  the	  perpetuity	  of	  a	  sacred	  language	  means	  the	  Arab	  
world	  (or	  in	  Gellner’s	  broad-­‐brush	  application	  the	  entire	  Muslim	  world)	  is	  stuck	  with	  an	  
immutable	  and	  effectively	  pre-­‐modern	  society:	  
	  
A	  Muslim	  lawyer-­theologian,	  literate	  in	  written	  Arabic,	  or	  a	  medieval	  clerk	  with	  his	  
Latin,	  is	  employable,	  and	  substitutable	  for	  another,	  throughout	  the	  region	  of	  his	  
religion.	  Inside	  the	  religious	  zones,	  there	  are	  no	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  
trade	  in	  intellect:	  what	  later	  become	  ‘national’	  boundaries,	  present	  no	  serious	  
obstacles.	  If	  the	  clerk	  is	  competent	  in	  the	  written	  language,	  say	  Latin	  or	  classical	  
Arabic,	  his	  vernacular	  of	  origin	  is	  of	  little	  interest.58	  
	  
Gellner,	  despite	  “a	  number	  of	  grand	  and	  unexamined	  assertions	  about	  Islam,”59	  nonetheless	  
emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  High	  Arabic—and	  its	  exclusive	  claim	  on	  High	  culture	  in	  the	  state	  
institutions	  of	  modern	  Arab	  states—as	  the	  principal	  agent	  smothering	  the	  development	  of	  
ethnic	  nationalism	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  In	  this	  regard,	  he	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  
anthropologists,	  linguists	  and	  sociolinguists	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  who	  detail	  the	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  demotic	  Arabics	  are	  socially	  marginalized	  and	  politically	  gelded.	  
Diglossia	  in	  Arab	  states	  is	  exceptionally	  effective	  in	  halting	  the	  evolution	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  
identities	  and	  ethnonational	  movements.	  
	  
How	  then	  does	  this	  account	  for	  the	  (one-­‐time)	  sincerity	  of	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism,	  the	  
sustained	  pre-­‐eminent	  status	  of	  Classical	  Arabic	  among	  both	  elites	  and	  non-­‐elites	  across	  
the	  Arab	  world,	  or	  the	  current	  ascension	  of	  the	  language	  in	  the	  transnational	  public	  sphere	  
of	  satellite	  broadcasting?	  Why	  are	  demotic	  Arabics	  perpetually	  disdained	  publicly	  as	  
impure,	  corrupt,	  vulgar,	  and	  illegitimate,	  even	  though	  privately	  they	  are	  the	  mother	  
tongues	  of	  all	  Arabs	  in	  the	  region?	  If	  demotic	  Arabics	  are	  prevented	  from	  evolving	  as	  High	  
culture	  languages,	  and	  Classical	  Arabic	  remains	  an	  acquired	  language	  shared	  only	  by	  the	  
well-­‐educated	  minority	  of	  disparate	  states	  that	  are	  not	  defined	  by	  specific	  ethnicities	  or	  
cultures,	  what	  is	  the	  nationality	  of	  an	  Arab	  citizen	  in	  an	  Arab	  state?	  
	  
I	  propose	  here	  that	  ethnic	  Arab	  citizens	  of	  Arab	  states	  are	  dinational,	  a	  political	  condition	  
stemming	  from	  diglossia.	  I	  offer	  this	  term	  to	  describe	  a	  population	  comprised	  of	  persons	  
                                                
58	  Ernest	  Gellner,	  Thought	  and	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  Nature	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  Human	  Society	  (Chicago:	  University	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  Chicago	  Press,	  1964),	  p.	  161.	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who	  identify	  politically,	  internally,	  and	  simultaneously,	  with	  a	  pair	  of	  parallel	  communities.	  	  
One	  identity	  is	  ethnic:	  local,	  organic,	  and	  tactile.	  The	  other	  identity	  is	  supra-­‐ethnic:	  	  
extraterritorial,	  synthetic,	  and	  abstract.	  A	  native	  of	  Marrakech,	  for	  example,	  is	  raised	  in	  a	  
distinct	  culture,	  with	  a	  distinct	  language	  (demotic	  Moroccan)	  and	  distinct	  social	  practices	  
that	  easily	  distinguish	  his	  from	  natives	  of	  Alexandria	  or	  Amman.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  native	  
of	  Marrakech	  is	  also	  taught,	  in	  public	  schools,	  to	  read	  and	  write	  a	  second	  language,	  High	  
Arabic.	  His	  mother	  tongue	  is	  neither	  written	  nor	  read.	  His	  own	  language	  is	  not	  in	  his	  
textbooks	  and	  it	  affords	  no	  benefits	  of	  social	  mobility,	  but	  does	  afford	  the	  benefit	  of	  
belonging	  to	  a	  distinct	  society.	  Doctrinally,	  his	  state	  is	  not	  a	  nation-­‐state	  because	  Arab	  
citizens	  of	  Morocco	  are	  members	  of	  the	  “Arab	  nation,”	  conceptually	  one	  people,	  an	  
imagined	  community	  linked	  by	  Classical	  Arabic	  and	  (usually)	  Islam,	  but	  spread	  across	  a	  
vast	  terrain	  and	  well	  over	  a	  dozen	  states.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  “Arab	  nation,”	  he	  
may	  identify	  with	  pan-­‐Arab	  concerns	  and	  share	  some	  common	  historical	  or	  political	  beliefs	  
with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  “Arab	  nation”	  who	  are	  nonetheless	  citizens	  of	  other	  Arab	  states.	  
A	  citizen	  of	  Morocco	  may	  be	  patriotic,	  loyal	  to	  his	  own	  government	  or	  his	  country’s	  
Olympic	  teams,	  but	  cannot	  be	  an	  ethnolinguistic	  nationalist	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  a	  Catalan	  or	  
Basque	  because	  his	  ethnicity	  and	  first	  language	  are	  not	  linked	  to	  his	  nationality.	  He	  is	  at	  
once	  divided	  linguistically,	  culturally,	  cognitively,	  and	  politically	  between	  Moroccan	  and	  
Arab.	  This	  division	  is	  dinational.	  	  	  
	  
The	  term	  dinational	  is	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  term	  binational.	  A	  binational	  state,	  such	  
as	  Canada	  (Anglophone/Francophone)	  or	  Belgium	  (Flemish/Walloon),	  is	  a	  state	  that	  is	  
home	  to	  a	  separate	  pair	  of	  distinct	  societies,	  most	  often	  (but	  not	  always)	  characterized	  as	  
ethnolinguistic	  nations.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  term	  “binational”	  describes	  both	  the	  population—
comprised	  of	  two	  national	  communities—but	  also	  describes	  the	  state,	  which	  represents	  
both	  nations	  in	  public	  institutions.	  A	  state	  may	  be	  binational,	  or	  even	  multinational,	  but	  not	  
dinational.	  The	  two	  parts	  of	  a	  citizen’s	  dinational	  identity	  may	  be	  incorporated	  
simultaneously.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  state	  anthem	  of	  bi-­‐national	  Canada	  may	  be	  sung	  in	  either	  
French	  or	  English,	  but	  not	  in	  French	  and	  English	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
	  
Doubters	  should	  raise	  the	  objection	  of	  Greece.	  Here	  is	  (or	  was)	  a	  diglossic	  population	  of	  
Greeks	  who	  experienced	  the	  sociolinguistic	  reality	  of	  diglossia	  between	  Katharevousa	  and	  
Demotic	  Greek,	  yet	  the	  state	  was	  (and	  is)	  a	  nation-­‐state,	  a	  territory	  made	  sovereign	  by	  the	  
express	  wishes	  of	  a	  unique	  people	  who	  were	  protected	  and	  reproduced	  by	  the	  institutions	  
of	  a	  state	  of	  their	  own.	  What	  distinguishes	  Arab	  states	  from	  Greece	  is	  that	  no	  one	  Arab	  state	  
can	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  nation-­‐state	  when	  the	  “Arab	  nation”	  is	  divided	  among	  many	  individual	  
states.	  Each	  Arab	  state	  is	  sovereign	  because	  it	  is	  recognized	  by	  other	  states,	  and	  also	  
because	  the	  regimes	  in	  each	  maintain	  (more	  or	  less)	  a	  monopoly	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  but	  no	  
single	  Arab	  state	  can	  claim	  legitimacy	  resting	  on	  the	  doctrine	  of	  national	  self-­‐
determination.	  This,	  sensibly,	  is	  why	  the	  dream	  of	  pan-­‐Arab	  nationalism	  was	  a	  single	  entity	  
“from	  the	  Gulf	  to	  the	  Ocean.”	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A	  dinational	  individual	  identifies	  with	  both	  the	  shared	  culture	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  kin	  and	  the	  
extended	  culture	  of	  a	  supra-­‐ethnic	  collective.	  In	  Huntington’s	  usage	  this	  collective	  is	  a	  
civilization,	  the	  	  “highest	  cultural	  grouping	  of	  people	  and	  the	  broadest	  level	  of	  cultural	  
identity	  people	  have	  short	  of	  that	  which	  distinguishes	  humans	  from	  other	  species.”	  He	  
explicitly	  lists	  the	  “Arab”	  civilization	  alongside	  the	  Western,	  Confucian,	  Japanese,	  Hindu,	  
Slavic-­‐Orthodox,	  Latin	  American,	  and	  (possibly)	  African	  civilizations.	  (Tellingly,	  and	  
incorrectly,	  he	  follows	  Bernard	  Lewis	  by	  interchanging	  the	  term	  “Arab	  civilization”	  with	  the	  
terms	  “Islamic	  civilization”	  and	  even	  “Arab	  Islamic	  civilization.”)60	  Yet	  a	  civilization—
however	  else	  defined—is	  not	  only	  supra-­‐ethnic	  but	  also	  supra-­‐national:	  there	  may	  be	  any	  
number	  of	  nation-­‐states	  that	  are	  all	  members	  of	  the	  same	  civilization.	  Even	  if	  one	  accepts	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  single	  Arab	  civilization,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  a	  single	  Arab	  nation.	  
Following	  the	  doctrine	  of	  national	  self-­‐determination,	  a	  nation	  needs	  a	  state	  of	  its	  own	  and	  
a	  state	  is	  legitimate	  because	  it	  represents	  its	  own	  nation.	  A	  civilization	  needs	  neither:	  in	  
Huntington’s	  usage	  “a	  civilization	  is	  a	  cultural	  entity.”61	  A	  strictly	  cultural	  entity	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  mobilize	  for	  self-­‐rule.	  Unlike	  a	  state,	  a	  cultural	  entity	  does	  not	  enter	  into	  
treaties,	  build	  armies,	  issue	  passports,	  or	  require	  recognition	  from	  other	  cultural	  entities.	  
	  
Opening	  a	  window	  on	  the	  future	  of	  Arabic	  illuminates	  the	  possible	  political	  futures	  of	  Arab	  
peoples	  and	  Arab	  states.	  In	  one	  of	  Ferguson’s	  final	  papers,	  presented	  in	  1990,	  he	  
clairvoyantly	  anticipates	  the	  current	  conundrum	  of	  High	  Arabic	  as	  a	  transnational,	  extra-­‐
territorial,	  supra-­‐ethnic	  language	  community	  that	  cannot	  accommodate	  the	  public	  and	  civil	  
expressions	  of	  specific	  demotic	  Arab	  peoples	  confined	  by	  very	  real	  borders	  in	  opaque	  Arab	  
states:	  
	  
Arabic	  is	  undergoing	  standardization	  on	  a	  vast	  scale	  and	  in	  an	  unusual	  language	  
situation.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  the	  fact	  of	  diglossia,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  a	  diglossia	  situation	  without	  a	  
center	  that	  would	  be	  a	  natural	  place	  for	  the	  standardizing	  variety	  to	  emerge	  and	  
spread.	  In	  most	  cases	  where	  a	  diglossia	  changes	  into	  a	  single	  standard-­with-­variation	  
situation	  there	  is	  a	  center—whether	  cultural,	  economic,	  political,	  communicative,	  or	  a	  
combination	  of	  these—that	  becomes	  the	  chief	  source	  of	  the	  standardizing	  variety.	  	  
Another	  alternative,	  of	  course,	  is	  for	  the	  language	  eventually	  to	  split	  into	  several	  
different	  standards,	  as	  happened	  with	  Latin	  and	  the	  Romance	  languages…	  Now	  is	  the	  
time	  to	  study	  these	  conflicting	  trends...62	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Ferguson’s	  challenge	  was	  accepted	  by	  a	  number	  of	  social	  sciences,	  including	  anthropology,	  
sociology,	  and	  linguistics,	  yet	  political	  scientists	  have	  not	  only	  ignored	  the	  specific	  
challenge	  of	  studying	  Arabic	  language	  politics,	  but	  also	  neglected	  the	  importance	  of	  
comparative	  language	  politics	  in	  general.	  Yet	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  challenge	  dovetails	  
a	  lively	  and	  expanding	  debate	  over	  the	  question	  of	  democratic	  Muslim	  exceptionalism.	  On	  
one	  side	  are	  authors	  who	  point	  to	  the	  peculiar	  politics	  of	  “Arab,	  Not	  Muslim,	  
Exceptionalism;”63	  on	  the	  other,	  “The	  Reality	  of	  Muslim	  Exceptionalism”	  thesis	  argues	  that	  
the	  politics	  of	  not	  just	  Arabs,	  but	  all	  Islamic	  peoples,	  are	  essentially	  problematic.64	  	  	  
	  
Yet	  both	  of	  these	  positions	  elide	  a	  fundamental	  point:	  nationalism,	  while	  not	  necessarily	  
liberal,	  is	  conducive	  to	  democracy	  by	  defining	  the	  demos.65	  It	  makes	  plain	  where	  to	  draw	  
borders	  because	  the	  doctrine	  of	  national	  self-­‐determination	  requires	  that	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  
nation	  be	  coterminous	  with	  the	  state.	  Nationalism	  sets	  the	  parameters	  for	  who	  is	  or	  is	  not	  a	  
citizen,	  who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  vote,	  and	  which	  culture	  will	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  official	  
status,	  state	  support,	  and	  dedicated	  institutions.	  Again,	  a	  nation-­‐state	  is	  sovereign	  because	  
it	  represents	  and	  protects	  a	  unique	  people	  who	  claim	  the	  right	  of	  self-­‐rule.	  Arab	  states	  
maintain	  a	  shared	  High	  language	  and	  literate	  High	  culture,	  but	  exclude	  demotic	  Arabics	  and	  
ethnolinguistic	  identifications.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  separate	  (demotic)	  Arab	  peoples	  will	  not	  emerge	  one	  day	  as	  separate	  
nations.	  This	  temporal	  caution	  stems	  from	  Walker	  Connor’s	  warning	  that	  “there	  still	  exist	  
large	  numbers	  of	  people	  for	  whom	  national	  identity	  lies	  in	  the	  future,”	  including	  the	  Arabs,	  
“who	  were	  among	  the	  very	  earliest	  non-­‐European	  peoples	  to	  produce	  an	  elite	  that	  was	  
imbued	  with	  national	  consciousness	  and	  dedicated	  its	  development	  to	  the	  masses.	  And	  yet,	  
after	  more	  than	  a	  half-­‐century	  [in	  1994]	  of	  such	  efforts,	  Arab	  nationalism	  remains	  
anomalistically	  weak.	  The	  national	  literati	  may	  therefore	  be	  a	  poor	  guide	  to	  the	  actual	  level	  
of	  national	  consciousness.”66	  Thus,	  gauging	  the	  “actual	  level”	  of	  ethnolinguistic	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identification	  within	  a	  specific	  Arab	  population	  would	  benefit	  from	  asking	  the	  opinions	  of	  
under-­‐educated	  majorities	  rather	  than	  depending	  solely	  on	  the	  views	  of	  highly	  educated	  
elites	  who	  benefit	  from	  the	  status	  quo.	  
	  
Arab	  states	  are	  not	  currently	  nation-­‐states.	  While	  most	  citizens	  of	  Arab	  states	  are	  
purportedly	  members	  of	  the	  “Arab	  nation,”	  this	  grants	  no	  particular	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  
regimes	  and	  institutions	  of	  any	  one	  state	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  Current	  Arab	  regimes	  cannot	  
claim	  to	  represent	  a	  specific	  nation,	  e.g.	  “the	  Libyan	  nation”	  or	  “the	  Syrian	  nation,”	  and	  
instead	  rely	  on	  “centralized	  and	  authoritarian	  states”	  to	  stay	  in	  power.67	  By	  logical	  
extension,	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  suppression	  of	  ethnolinguistic	  
nationalism	  in	  Arab	  states	  contributes	  to	  the	  suppression	  of	  democracy	  in	  Arab	  states.	  	  
Demonstrating	  a	  causal	  link,	  of	  course,	  would	  require	  close	  inspection	  of	  many	  countries	  
and	  multiple	  speech	  communities;	  thus,	  what	  is	  considered	  here	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  proposes	  
hypotheses,	  but	  does	  not	  pretend	  to	  offer	  proof.	  	  
	  
The	  bankrupt	  leadership	  of	  many	  Arab	  regimes	  is	  often	  blamed	  for	  a	  political	  vacuum	  that	  
invites	  Islamist	  ideology	  into	  the	  public	  sphere.	  This	  was	  illustrated	  in	  spectacular	  fashion	  
by	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  after	  the	  people	  of	  Egypt	  succeeded	  in	  overthrowing	  their	  autocrat,	  yet	  
then	  chose	  to	  elect	  an	  Islamist	  government.	  Failing	  to	  respond	  effectively	  to	  a	  “wide	  range	  
of	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  problems	  in	  the	  Arab	  world”	  has	  “not	  only	  jeopardized	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  current	  regimes,	  it	  [has]	  enabled	  the	  Islamists	  to	  offer	  an	  Islamic	  
alternative.”68	  This	  begs	  the	  question,	  why	  is	  there	  no	  alternative	  presented	  by	  some	  
political	  entrepreneur	  rallying	  people	  behind	  their	  own	  language,	  their	  own	  unique	  culture,	  
and	  promoting	  instead	  a	  demotic	  Arabic	  ethnolinguistic	  nationalism?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
largest	  Arab	  state,	  Haeri’s	  answer	  is	  provocative	  but	  compelling:	  
	  
Most	  Egyptians	  find	  speaking	  and	  writing	  in	  classical	  Arabic	  difficult,	  especially	  given	  
the	  dire	  state	  of	  pre-­college	  education.	  The	  official	  language	  thus	  acts	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  
their	  participation	  in	  the	  political	  realm.	  There	  is	  of	  course	  no	  suggestion	  that	  here	  
that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  democracy	  in	  Egypt.	  But	  the	  language	  
situation	  makes	  a	  strong	  comment	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  politics	  in	  that	  country.69	  
	  
More	  than	  a	  comment,	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  socioeconomic	  and	  political	  patterns	  among	  the	  
fifty-­‐seven	  member	  states	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Conference	  (of	  which	  twenty-­‐
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two	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Arab	  League)	  shows	  that	  higher	  literacy	  rates	  in	  OIC	  countries	  
significantly	  “increase	  the	  odds	  of	  expanded	  political	  rights.”70	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
The	  positive	  relationship	  between	  literacy	  and	  social	  cohesion	  is	  most	  famously	  detailed	  as	  
an	  effect	  of	  what	  Benedict	  Anderson	  called	  “print	  capitalism”	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  nations.71	  
In	  the	  study	  of	  democracy,	  Robert	  Dahl	  highlighted	  the	  relationship	  between	  literacy	  and	  
civil	  society	  in	  his	  canonical	  Polyarchy.72	  Yet	  a	  most	  eloquent	  exposition	  of	  the	  
consequences	  of	  a	  language	  barrier	  is	  from	  political	  philosopher	  Will	  Kymlicka.	  His	  point	  of	  
origin	  is	  Canada	  and	  his	  conceptual	  development	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  multi-­‐lingual	  politics	  
of	  a	  bi-­‐national	  federation.	  At	  first	  glance,	  there	  is	  little	  overlap	  between	  a	  theorist	  of	  
multiculturalism	  and	  the	  observations	  of	  an	  Arabic	  sociolinguist.	  Yet	  there	  is	  an	  uncanny	  
correlation	  between	  Kymlicka’s	  views	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  
democracy	  with	  Haeri’s	  analysis	  of	  Egyptian	  politics:	  
	  
Democratic	  politics	  is	  politics	  in	  the	  vernacular.	  The	  average	  citizen	  only	  feels	  
comfortable	  debating	  political	  issues	  in	  their	  own	  tongue.	  As	  a	  general	  rule,	  it	  is	  only	  
elites	  who	  have	  fluency	  with	  more	  than	  one	  language,	  and	  who	  have	  the	  continual	  
opportunity	  to	  maintain	  and	  develop	  these	  language	  skills,	  and	  who	  feel	  comfortable	  
debating	  political	  issues	  in	  another	  tongue	  within	  multilingual	  settings.	  …	  the	  more	  
political	  debate	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  vernacular,	  the	  more	  participatory	  it	  will	  be.73	  
	  
The	  politics	  of	  Arab	  states	  may	  be	  described	  with	  many	  terms,	  but	  ‘participatory’	  remains	  
problematic.	  	  It	  would	  seem	  Arab	  states	  exclusively	  endorse	  Modern	  Standard	  Arabic	  in	  an	  
unsuccessful	  attempt	  to	  create	  Standard	  Arabs,	  but	  Arab	  states	  are	  successful	  in	  
suppressing	  the	  development	  of	  ethnic	  identifications	  and	  erstwhile	  ethnolinguistic	  
mobilizations.	  As	  a	  result,	  Arab	  citizens	  of	  Arab	  states	  exist	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  political	  purgatory,	  
members	  of	  neither	  a	  civic	  nor	  an	  ethnic	  nation,	  and	  continue	  to	  avoid	  this	  and	  other	  
“dichotomies	  of	  choice—such	  as	  between	  religious	  vs.	  secular,	  or	  national	  vs.	  country	  
(qawmiyya	  vs.	  wataniyya)—in	  forging	  their	  political-­‐cultural	  identities.”74	  They	  are	  
consigned	  to	  citizenship	  in	  states	  with	  no	  self-­‐evident	  raison	  d’être	  and	  an	  erstwhile	  pan-­‐
                                                
70	  B.	  R.	  Calfano	  and	  E.	  Sahliyeh,	  “Determining	  Democracy	  in	  the	  Organization	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
Conference,”	  Social	  Science	  Quarterly	  89,	  no.	  3	  (2008):	  763.	  
71	  Benedict	  R.	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origins	  and	  Spread	  of	  
Nationalism	  	  (London:	  Verso	  Editions,	  1983).	  
72	  Robert	  Alan	  Dahl,	  Polyarchy:	  Participation	  and	  Opposition	  	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  
Press,	  1971).	  
73	  Will	  Kymlicka,	  Politics	  in	  the	  Vernacular:	  Nationalism,	  Multiculturalism,	  and	  Citizenship	  	  
(Oxford,	  UK	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  213-­‐14.	  
74	  Saad	  Eddin	  Ibrahim,	  “Ethnic	  Conflict	  and	  State-­‐Building	  in	  the	  Arab	  World,”	  International	  
Social	  Science	  Journal	  50,	  no.	  156	  (1998):	  p.	  235.	  
Mabry	  /	  The	  Levantine	  Review	  Volume	  2	  Number	  1	  (Spring	  2013)	  





Arab	  ‘nationality’	  divided	  perpetually	  among	  many	  states,	  many	  peoples,	  and	  many	  mother	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